Treaty Obligations and National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration by Park, William W. & Yanos, Alexander A.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 58 | Issue 2 Article 2
1-2006
Treaty Obligations and National Law: Emerging
Conflicts in International Arbitration
William W. Park
Alexander A. Yanos
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
William W. Park and Alexander A. Yanos, Treaty Obligations and National Law: Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration, 58
Hastings L.J. 251 (2006).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol58/iss2/2
Treaty Obligations and National Law:
Emerging Conflicts in International Arbitration
WILLIAM W. PARK* AND ALEXANDER A. YANOS**
Pacta sunt servanda'
INTRODUCTION
In determining the effect of treaties, the adage pacta sunt servanda
("agreements are to be kept")2 remains a foundation of international
law? By contrast, when American courts consider international
conventions, the principle barely rises to the rank of analytic starting
point.
In the United States, the application and interpretation of
international treaty obligations implicate an intricate interplay with
Constitutional mandates and federal statutes." As a matter of domestic
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I. Taking its source from Roman and canon law, this principle forms the basis for Article 26 of
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which states "[e]very treaty in force is binding upon
the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith." May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
Formulated as "Pacta quantumcunque nuda servanda sunt'" ("Pacts, however naked, must be kept")
the adage appears in the canon law codification of the 12th century Pope Gregory IX. Decretals of
Gregory IX (1234) 1.35.1.2.
2. The essence of the concept appears in Justinian's Code: "sancimus nemini licere adversus
pacta sua venire et contrahentem decipere" ("we shall not allow anyone to contravene his agreements
and thereby disappoint (deceive) his contractor"). Code Just. 2.3.29pr (Justinian 531). In the case of a
person who agreed not to raise certain defenses, it was said that a mere pact (without special form)
could create estoppel even without justifying a claim. Medieval canon lawyers abandoned the Roman
requirements of form, to hold all agreements binding unless illegal or immoral. See generally JAMES
GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN CONTRACT DOCTRINE (199I); THE ENFORCEABILITY
OF PROMISES IN EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW (James Gordley ed., 2OO). The common law, of course,
disagreed, and insisted on either consideration or the formality of a deed.
3. See, e.g., IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 591-92 (6th ed. 2003). The
corollary, of course, is that treaties are binding "so long as things stand as they are" (the so-called
clausula rebus sic stantibus). See generally J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 317-45 (Sir Humphrey
Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963); F.A. MANN, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 327-59 (1973).
4. See, e.g., Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 435 (1920) (upholding the Migratory Bird Treaty
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law, the Constitution trumps treaties.5 However, the same may not be
true of other sources of law. Although not free from scholarly debate,6
acts of Congress remain on a par with treaties, prevailing over
inconsistent treaty provisions only pursuant to either (i) the "later in
8time" rule7 or (ii) an explicit congressional pronouncement.
According to rules of international law, however, neither a
Constitutional mandate nor the enactment of a statute provides an
excuse for a treaty violation.9 Prevailing opinion holds that an act
wrongful under the law of nations remains so even if a nation's internal
law deems otherwise. 0
Act of 1918, which gave effect to an earlier treaty between the United States and Great Britain
providing for the protection of birds that traveled between the United States and Canada). See
generally IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 31-53 (6th ed. 2003); Louis
HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 149, 153 (3rd ed. 1993); L. OPPENHEIM,
OPPENHEIM'S INTERNATIONAL LAW 85 (Sir Robert Jennings & Sir Arthur Watts eds., 9th ed. 1996).
5. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, t6-17 (1957); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924);
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (189o); Mayor of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. 662, 736-
37 (1836); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 115(3)
(1987).
6. See Vasan Kesavan, The Three Tiers of Federal Law, oo Nw. U. L. REV. 1479 (arguing that
statutes are superior to treaties irrespective of time, based on what that author called the
Constitution's "lexical priority" in Article VI, Section 2, which lists Constitution, statutes, and treaties
in just that order). The precise Constitutional text reads as follows: "The Constitution, and the Laws of
the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land . U.S.
CONST. art. VI, § 2.
7. Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (I998) (per curiam) (citing Reid, 354 U.S. at I8, Whitney
v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888)). In Breard, a Paraguayan citizen sought to invalidate his
murder conviction based on the State of Virginia's failure to advise him of his right to the assistance of
the Paraguayan consul, as required in the Vienna Convention on Consular Affairs, Apr. 24, 1963, 21
U.S.T. 77. Breard, 523 U.S. at 373. The Supreme Court declined a petition for writ of certiorari, noting,
among other things, that the obligations of the United States under the Vienna Convention had been
preempted by statute. Id. at 376. For a superb summary of both the state of the law and the
interpretative uncertainties, see generally Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties:
Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 313 (2001).
8. For an example of "treaty override," see Foreign Investment in Real Property Tax Act, Pub.
L. No. 96-499, § 1125 94 Stat. 2682, 269o (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.), which provides
that no treaty shall exempt or reduce the tax otherwise imposed on gain by foreigners from disposition
of American real estate. See I.R.C. §§ 897, 894(a), 785 2(d), 871, 882 (2006). On tax treaty
interpretation, see Richard L. Doernberg, Overriding Tax Treaties: The U.S. Perspective, 9 EMORY
INT'L L. REV. 71 (1995); Richard L. Doernberg, Legislative Overrides of Income Tax Treaties: The
Branch Profits Tax and Congressional Arrogation of Authority, 42 TAX LAW. 173 (1989); David Sachs,
Is the 19th Century Doctrine of Treaty Override Good Law for Modern Day Tax Treaties?, 47 TAX
LAW. 867 (i994); Robert Thornton Smith, Tax Treaty Interpretation by the Judiciary, 49 TAX LAW. 845,
848-49 (1996).
9. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 33 1
("A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a
treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 46.").
io. Under Article III of the International Law Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, "[tihe characterization of an act of a State as internationally
wrongful is governed by international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization
[Vol. 58:251
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Moreover, it remains settled law in the United States that courts
should not construe a statute to violate international law if any other
plausible construction presents itself." Thus, American judges remain
under a duty to avoid, if at all possible, placing the United States in
breach of its international obligations.'"
Three controversial court of appeals decisions on arbitration
highlight the contours of these conflicts.' 3 The cases also serve as a
springboard from which to explore several vexing questions related to
private dispute resolution. In each instance, the court dismissed a
petition to confirm a foreign arbitral award subject to the United Nations
Arbitration Convention, commonly known as the New York
Convention.'" The Convention obligates the United States and 136 other
signatory countries to enforce foreign arbitration awards, subject to a
limited litany of defenses related principally to procedural fairness.'5
of the same act as lawful by internal law." Report of the International Law Commission to the General
Assembly, 56 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. to) at 1, U.N. Doc. AI56lio (2001) [hereinafter ILC Report]; see
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § I II cmt. a (987)
("[F]ailure of the United States to carry out an obligation [of international law] on the ground of its
unconstitutionality will not relieve the United States of responsibility under international law.").
II. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (18o4). In language that is now locus
classicus, Chief Justice Marshall wrote that "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains." Id. The decision, well-known for this
dictum, also rewards readers with a discussion of economic rights. On moving to the Caribbean island
of St. Thomas, a Connecticut merchant named Jared Shattuck had become a subject of the Danish
crown. Id. at 65-66. During undeclared hostilities with the French (1798-i8oo), Congress passed Acts
of Non-Intercourse providing for seizure of American ships trading with France. Id. at 64-65. After an
armed American ship captured Shattuck's vessel en route to a French port, the Supreme Court found
that the United States had no right under international law to seize a neutral vessel, absent a formal
declaration of war, which did not then exist. Id. at 125. Thus the Acts of Non-Intercourse could not be
interpreted to justify confiscation of Shattuck's vessel. Id.
12. Id: see also Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 178 n.35 (993) (affirming
application of Charming Betsy canon to all matters of federal statutory construction); South Dakota v.
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679,697 n.16 (1993) (applying canon to administrative regulations).
13. See Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminium Factory," 283 F.3d 2o8
(4th Cir. 2002); Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1122 &
n.5 (9th Cir. 2002); Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488,498-
501 (2d Cir. 2002).
14. Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June io, 1958, 3
U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. Twenty-four countries originally
signed the Convention, and the rest have joined by accession or succession. Ratification by the most
recent adherents, Afghanistan, Liberia, and Pakistan, brings to 137 the total number of countries
bound by the treaty. The United States ratified the New York Convention subject to two limitations:
(i) geographical reciprocity (convention to be applied only to awards rendered in the territory of other
contracting States); and (ii) applicability to commercial disputes only. Daniel A. Losk, Note, Section
1782 (a) After Intel, Reconciling Policy Considerations and a Proposed Framework to Extend Judicial
Assistance to International Arbitral Tribunals, 27 CARDOzo L. REV. 1035, 1053 n. 117 (2005).
15. See New York Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(3) ("When... acceding to this
Convention... any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply the Convention to
the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another Contracting State. It
may also declare that it will apply the Convention only to differences arising out of legal relationships,
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In two of these decisions, Base Metal,6 and Glencore Grain,'7 the
courts concluded that they lacked personal jurisdiction over the foreign
respondent, and thus could not enforce the awards. The third case,
Monegasque de Reassurances, decided that award confirmation had
been sought in an unsuitable forum, and thus must be refused.'9 In Base
Metal, the respondent allegedly owned assets within the forum, while
such was apparently not the case in Glencore Grain or Monegasque de
Reassurances.
The decisions came as a surprise to an arbitration community that
had been accustomed to the judicial emphasis on the pro-enforcement
policy created by the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) and the New York
Convention. Under the tutelage of a line of United States Supreme
Court cases," American courts have found arbitration agreements and
awards to trump vital public interests related to antitrust," securities
regulation, 2 maritime transport, 3 RICO, 4 the Bankruptcy Code, 5
whether contractual or not, which are considered as commercial under the national law of the State
making such declaration."). Many countries, including the United States, have adopted the
Convention subject to a reciprocity reservation making it applicable only to awards made in the
territory of another Convention country. Losk, supra note 15, at 1053 n.I 17.
i6. Base Metal, 283 F.3d at 215-16, (declining to confirm an award made in Russia against a
Russian manufacturer that was deemed to lack "minimum contacts" with the forum).
I7. Glencore Grain, 284 F.3d at 1128 (upholding a district court decision refusing to recognize an
award made against an Indian rice exporter deemed not to be present in or having assets in the
district).
18. Monegasque de Reassurances, 311 F.3d at 498-5oi (declining on grounds of forum non
conveniens to enforce an award made in Moscow against the government of Ukraine and a Ukrainian
corporation).
i9. The decision in Monegasque rested on notions of forum non conveniens, which relate to
whether a court is suitable or appropriate to hear a dispute, notwithstanding that it might otherwise
have jurisdiction. See Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 248-49 (I98i). The appropriateness of
the court depends on convenience to the litigants as well as factors related to the public interest in
proper administration of justice. Whether a court is inconvenient constitutes one element among many
that must be balanced in determining that the forum is (or is not) an appropriate one to hear the case.
20. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 631 (1985)
(stating that the United States has an "emphatic public policy" in favor of enforcement, which "applies
with special force in the field of international commerce"); Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506,
520 n.15 (i974) ("The goal of the [New York] Convention, and the principal purpose underlying
American adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement of
commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which
agreements to arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.").
21. See Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 631.
22. See Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 487 (1989); Scherk, 417
U.S. at 520 n.15.
23. On arbitration under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act of 1971, see generally Vimar v. M/V
Sky Reefer, 515 U.S. 528 (1995).
24. On the arbitrability of claims under the Racketeer Influenced & Corrupt Practices Act, see
Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (holding a RICO claim arbitrable
under the Arbitration Act).
25. See, e.g., Societe Nationale Algerienne pour la Recherche, la Production, le Transport, la
Transformation et la Commercialisation des Hydrocarbures v. Distrigas Corp., 8o B.R. 6o6, 613 (D.
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consumer protection,6 and even foreign policy. 7
The reasoning of these cases has been subject to considerable
scholarly comment." Moreover, a report by the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York suggests that a sound basis exists for enforcement
of New York Convention awards solely on the basis of assets within the
forum."
One line of argument, supported by this Article, suggests that the
cases place the United States in breach of its treaty obligations under the
New York Convention, which limits non-recognition of foreign awards30
to a narrowly-drafted litany of defenses.3 The other principal concern is
that the decisions incorrectly applied United States law concerning
Mass. 1987).
26. See, e.g., Doctor's Associates v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos.,
Inc. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (i995); Southland v. Keating, 465 U.S. i (1984); Sec. Indus. Assoc. v.
Connolly, 883 F.2d 114 (ist Cir. 1989).
27. See, e.g., Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Soci6t6 G~nerale de l'Industrie du Papier
(RAKTA), 508 F.2d 969 (2d Cir. '974).
28. See, e.g., Harry Arkin, Problems of enforcement of foreign arbitral awards in the United States,
II IBA ARB. COMMrrrEE NEWSL. 44 (2oo6); D. Brian King & Aaron J. Benjamin, Enforcing Foreign
Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention: Jurisdiction Over a Party or its Property as a
Prerequisite in the United States, INTL. Att. REP., Apr. 2003, at 20, 2o; Joseph E. Neuhaus, Current
Issues in the Enforcement of International Arbitration Awards, 36 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 23
(2004); William W. Park, The Specificity of International Arbitration: The Case for FAA Reform, 36
VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1241, 1264 n.99 (2003); Dmitri Santoro, Forum Non Conveniens: A Valid
Defense Under The New York Convention? 21 A.S.A. BULLETIN 713 (2003); Linda J. Silberman,
International Arbitration: Comments from a Critic, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 9, 16 (2002); S.I. Strong,
Invisible Barriers to the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the United States, 21 J. INT'L ARB.
479 (2004); Russell J. Weintraub, Jurisdictional Problems in Enforcing Foreign Arbitral Awards, INT'L
ARE. NEWS, Summer 2002, at 2; Pelagia Ivanova, Note, Forum Non Conveniens and Personal
Jurisdiction: Procedural Limitations on the Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under the New
York Convention, 83 B.U. L. REV. 899 (2003).
29. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL DISPUTES COMMITEE OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE
CITY OF NEW YORK, LACK OF JURISDICTION AND FORUM NON CONVENIENS As DEFENSES To THE
ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS (Apr. 2005), http://www.nycbar.org/pdf/
report/ForeignArbitral.pdf. [hereinafter New York City Bar Report]. The Report believes that the
holding in Glencore is correct, but questions the reasoning and result in Base Metal. Id. Other aspects
of the Report include the suggestion that an agreement to arbitrate in one New York Convention
country is not sufficient to constitute consent to enforcement in other Convention states, and that
forum non conveniens should be available as a defense in an action against a non-party to the
arbitration.
3o. Different considerations may obtain in respect to awards rendered in the United States, even
when the New York Convention applies, because the dispute implicates international commerce or
involves foreign parties. See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d
Cir. 1997). The United States has opted to apply the New York Convention not only to awards
rendered abroad, but also to awards made in the United States but considered "non domestic"
because of some relevant international connection.
31. See generally Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2006) ("The court shall confirm the
award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or deferral of recognition or enforcement of the
award specified in the said Convention."). These defenses relate both to procedural fairness (invalid
arbitration agreement, lack of opportunity to present one's case, arbitrator excess of jurisdiction, and
irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal) and to the forum's public policy.
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constitutionally sufficient contacts with the respondent.32
Critical to the first issue (whether the decisions put the United States
in breach of its treaty obligations) is construction of the Convention
itself, which provides for award recognition "in accordance with the rules
of procedure of the territory where the award is relied upon."33 Until
recently, most observers considered that this provision related to the
form of enforcement,34 not the conditions for enforcement. Contracting
states certainly possess discretion with respect to minor ministerial
matters, such as the amount of filing fees or rules about where
enforcement motions must be brought. However, no support exists for
the proposition that the "procedure where relied upon" language was
intended to serve as a backdoor escape from recognition of legitimate
foreign awards.
To illustrate, in the United States an action to enforce a Convention
award may be brought in a federal district court by the claimant, or may
be removed by the defendant from state to federal court.35 This is clearly
a matter within the province of local (i.e., American) procedure, not
subject to any supranational treaty norm. Neither claimant nor
respondent can complain that it would rather have the case heard in a
state court.
Other Convention countries, of course, are free to create their own
rules designating who shall hear enforcement actions. The fact that in
Switzerland a similar action might be heard before a cantonal tribunal
(the equivalent of an American state court) is irrelevant. The rule relates
simply to enforcement modalities, not conditions that serve to bar
recognition itself.
Read in context, the "rules of procedure" language in Convention
Article III gives contracting states latitude in fashioning the practical
mechanics of award enforcement. The provision indicates that the
process for obtaining award enforcement or recognition is flexible, to be
determined by the local procedures.
This language relates to how recognition will be granted, not
whether recognition will be granted at all. To suggest an admittedly
imperfect analogy, most universities have procedures whereby admitted
students must register and pay tuition before they begin their studies.
Individuals failing to follow these procedures will not normally receive
instruction. However, registration formalities are not intended to include
a second set of entrance requirements. A student having already met
32. See discussion infra Part II.A.3, concerning footnote 36 of Shaffer v. Heitner.
33. New York Convention, supra note 14, art. III.
34. See ALBERT JAN VAN DEN BERG, THE NEW YORK ARBITRATION CONVENTION OF 1958 236-41
(1981).
35. 9 U.S.C. §§ 203-205.
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standards for admission would be understandably perplexed to find, on
arrival at the registrar's office, that she was required to sit for a set of
entrance exams.
The treaty text gives no hint of a suggestion that a contracting state
has the right to create roadblocks to award recognition. In consequence,
therefore, courts should be extremely reticent in establishing procedural
hurdles to award confirmation.36
In addition to suggesting that these cases may put the United States
in breach of its treaty obligations, this Article questions whether Base
Metal or Glencore Grain properly assessed the constitutional
requirements of due process within the context of award confirmation.
The United States Supreme Court has distinguished clearly between the
jurisdictional predicates for a court purporting to decide the merits of a
controversy, and those for a court asked to enforce a judgment already
rendered in a forum of competent jurisdiction.37
In the international arena, American projection of the qualities of
fair play and evenhandedness compels a robust respect for American
treaty commitments. As a general matter, this means that the process by
which the Convention is implemented must err on the side of facilitating,
rather than impeding, award recognition.
I. THE NEW YORK CONVENTION
A. AWARD ENFORCEMENT
i. Convention Overview
Beyond cavil, the New York Convention is one of the most
successful commercial treaties in history.3 The treaty creates what might
be described as a form of "full faith and credit" obligation toward foreign
arbitral awards. However, unlike the constitutional duty toward sister-
state judgments, a court's duty to recognize foreign awards is subject to a
defined set of expressly enumerated defenses to award recognition.39
Moreover, Convention obligations do more than merely signal
national acceptance of a general norm. *" Rather, its provisions create
36. With respect to awards not covered by the New York Convention, other standards would
apply. See, e.g., Int'l Bechtel Co. v. Dep't of Civil Aviation of Dubai, 360 F. Supp. 2d 136, 137-38
(D.D.C. 2005) (denying enforcement to an award rendered in Dubai, which is not a party to the New
York Convention).
37. See discussion infra Part II.A.3, of Shaffer v. Heitner.
38. New York Convention, supra note 14. Other important international arbitration treaties
include the 1965 Washington Convention (Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes
Between States and Nationals of Other States, Mar. 18, 1965, 575 U.N.T.S. 158) and the 1975 Panama
Convention (Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration, Jan. 30, 1975,
1438 U.N.T.S. 248).
39. See New York Convention, supra note 14, art. V.
40. For a discussion of treaties that possess a merely "expressive" function (signaling a position
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rights to be invoked by private beneficiaries of arbitration clauses, and
are routinely enforced by national courts.
Intended to make arbitration awards transportable from one country
to another, the New York Convention was conceived more than a half
century ago in a report issued by the International Chamber of
Commerce (ICC),4 I underscoring the commercial community's need for a
process streamlining award enforcement by shifting key burdens of proof
from the party seeking enforcement to the party resisting recognition.42
Under the Convention as adopted, an award rendered in Boston is
enforceable in Paris or London, regardless of whether it has been
confirmed by a court in Massachusetts.
When a dispute is subject to a written arbitration agreement, the
New York Convention requires courts to refer parties to arbitration and
to recognize the resulting foreign award.43 Recognition or enforcement
may be refused only for a restricted number of clearly defined defenses,
related to procedural fairness and public policy.'
Divided into two groups, these protections against abusive
arbitration allow courts to avoid lending their power to support
proceedings that lack integrity or awards inimical to basic public
interests. The first set of defenses, which must be proved by the party
resisting the award, includes matters such as an invalid arbitration
agreement, lack of opportunity to present one's case, arbitrator excess of
jurisdiction, and irregular composition of the arbitral tribunal.45 The
second set of defenses allows a court, on its own motion, to refuse to
enforce an award whose subject matter is not arbitrable or whose
rather than applying to determine outcomes), see Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties
Make a Difference?, III YALE L.J. 1935 (2002). By contrast, the New York Convention creates
substantive rights analogous to those that reduce fiscal obligations for beneficiaries of income tax
treaties.
41. International Chamber of Commerce, Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards: Report
and Preliminary Draft Convention, ICC Brochure No. 174 (1953), reprinted in U.N. Doc. E/C.2/373
and in 9 ICC Bull. 32 (May 1998).
42. The principal objective at that time was to liberate foreign arbitral awards from burdensome
"double exequatur" enforcement procedures that had required judicial recognition orders in both the
country where the award was made and the enforcement forum. See Convention on the Execution of
Foreign Arbitral Awards, Sept. 26, 1927, 92 L.N.T.S. 301 [hereinafter 1927 Geneva Convention], which
applied to awards made in pursuance to an agreement covered by the 1923 Geneva Protocol on
Arbitration Clauses, 27 L.N.T.S. 157. The party relying on the award had to provide documentary
evidence that the award "not be considered ... open to opposition, appel or pourvoi en cassation" and
that there exist no pending proceedings for the purpose of contesting the validity of the award. See
1927 Geneva Convention art. 4(2), with cross-reference to the requirements of Convention art. I (d).
43. Article II of the New York Convention requires recognition of the agreement to arbitrate, in
the form of a stay of court litigation, and Article III calls for award enforcement. New York
Convention, supra note 14, arts. II, III.
44. Id. art. V.
45. Id. art. V(i).
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substance violates the forum's public policy (ordre public) ,46 which the
United States has construed narrowly to include only our "most basic
notions of morality and justice."47 While the first set of Convention
defenses are intended to safeguard the parties against private injustice,
the second set serves as an explicit catchall for the enforcement of a
country's own vital interests.
The Convention's cornerstone lies in Article 1II, which provides that
"[e]ach contracting state shall recognize arbitral awards as binding and
enforce them in accordance with the rules of procedure of the territory
where the award is relied upon, under the conditions laid down in the
following articles." 8 This language has been understood as generating
what is sometimes called "a pro-enforcement bias" for arbitration
awards.49
Geography is the principal trigger for application of the Convention,
which covers primarily foreign arbitral awards." For example, an award
rendered in Boston would be covered by the Convention when presented
for enforcement against assets in Zurich, Paris, or London, but not when
recognition is sought before courts in Atlanta or Los Angeles. Inability
to meet the geographical test, however, does not mean the award
creditor is entirely out of luck. The Convention will also apply to
"awards not considered as domestic," a subtle and multi-faceted notion?'
Thus, a Boston award might be considered by a United States court as
"not domestic" if the factual configuration of the case contained foreign
parties or other significant cross-border elements. 2
46. Id. art. V(2).
47. Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Socidt6 G~nerale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA),
508 F.2d 969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974).
48. Article III also provides a non-discrimination provision, to the effect that "[t]here shall not be
imposed substantially more onerous conditions or higher fees or charges on the recognition or
enforcement of arbitral awards to which this Convention applies than are imposed on the recognition
or enforcement of domestic arbitral awards." New York Convention, supra note 14, art. 11I.
49. See, e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d I 114, I 20
(9th Cir. 2002).
5o. The first sentence of Convention Article I(i) refers to awards "made in the territory of a State
other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought." New York
Convention, supra note 14, art. I.
51. Id.
52. The concept of a non-domestic award has been given a wide scope, even in disputes entirely
between U.S. corporations. See Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., io7 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1997) (relating to
an ICC arbitration in New York arising from contract between two U.S. businesses to distribute
shampoo products in Poland). Lander extended the principle endorsed earlier in Bergesen v. Joseph
Muller Corp., 7o F.2d 928, 932-34 (2d Cir. 1983) (involving an award in New York between two
foreign parties). For an unusual approach to Convention coverage, see Cavalier Construction Co. v.
Bay Hotel & Resort, Ltd., No. 97-3833, 1998 WL 961281 (S.D. Fla. July 13, 1998). Offshore companies
contracted for construction of a hotel in Turks & Caicos Islands, stipulating that disputes would be
arbitrated in Miami. Id. at *I. The court refused to apply the Convention because it deemed a Miami
award not to be made "in the territory of another signatory to the Convention." Id. at *2 (emphasis
added); see also Ensco Offshore Co. v. Titan Marine LLC, 370 F. Supp. 2d 594, 6oi (S.D. Tex. 2005)
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2. Taxonomy: Recognition Without Enforcement
At the outset, a critical distinction must be made between an award's
enforcement and its recognition. Enforcement would normally be sought
by the winning claimant, looking to attach the respondent's assets. By
contrast, a winning respondent would ask for award recognition in order
to obtain res judicata effect against competing litigation brought by the
claimant in disregard of the award.
In an international context, a prevailing claimant might also seek a
judgment recognizing the arbitrator's decision, even absent the
identification of assets in the forum belonging to the respondent at that
time. The FAA provides a limited period for award confirmation. Thus,
any delay might prevent a later attempt to seize property. 3 In more than
one case, the victor in an arbitration has found assets justifying
jurisdiction, but too late. Enforcement was refused because too many
years had elapsed between the arbitrator's decision and the motion to
enforce.54
This is particularly important in an international context, where a
debtor may have several places in which to keep its property. For
multinational actors, the absence of assets within one nation's borders
need hardly be a perpetual state of affairs, particularly when that nation
is the United States, whose markets play so central a role in global
financial and commercial life that few large enterprises can ignore them
for very long.
In practice, a winning claimant may seek confirmation by an
American court in order to be ready to enforce its award if the foreign
debtor later brings assets into the United States. In some cases, the
claimant may need to move against assets on an ex parte basis to prevent
them from being sent abroad with the push of a computer button.
Likewise, a winning respondent would seek confirmation immediately in
(refusing to apply the Convention to an agreement providing for arbitration in London (under the
rules of Lloyd's Salvage Arbitrators) when both parties were American). Although the contract was
concluded in connection with salvage in offshore waters (about ninety miles off the coast of
Louisiana), the court in Ensco determined that the parties' contract had no "reasonable connection
between the parties' commercial relationship and a foreign state that is independent of the arbitral
clause itself." Id. at 599. On this issue, Lander took a more reasonable view, noting that the awkward
reference to "another Contracting State" indicated simply a Convention state (like the United States)
as opposed to a country that had failed to adhere to the Convention. Lander, 107 F.3d at 482.
53. Parties have three years from the making of the award to seek confirmation. 9 U.S.C. § 207
(2oo6).
54. See, e.g., Flatow v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 76 F. Supp. 2d 28, 29 (D.D.C. 1999) (denying
motion to enforce award that had been rendered more than three years prior to filing petition);
Seetransport Wiking Trader v. Navimpex Centrala, 989 F.2d 572, 581 (2d Cir. 1993) (declining to apply
the New York Convention to enforce an ICC award which had been rendered in Paris more than three
years before the enforcement action was brought). This critical need for award confirmation, even in
the absence of assets, supplies an important element in the calculus of litigation fairness that lies at the
heart of award recognition.
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order to foreclose the prospect of a later court action on the merits of the
dispute.
B. THE RECOGNITION FORUM'S RULES OF PROCEDURE
i. The Convention Text
In Monegasque de Reassurances, the Second Circuit seized upon the
reference in Article III to "rules of procedure of the territory where the
award is relied upon." The court found procedural doctrines such as
forum non conveniens to be permissible grounds for non-enforcement of
otherwise valid New York Convention awards, provided the awards were
not subject to discrimination when compared with the treatment of
domestic arbitral decisions.55 This line of reasoning does not seem to have
been relevant in Base Metal and Glencore, since both cases purported to
see a conflict between the New York Convention and the Constitution
itself.
In taking this approach, the court included an extended discussion of
the United States Supreme Court characterization of forum non
conveniens as "procedural rather than substantive," emphasizing that the
doctrine is applied in the enforcement of domestic awards as well. The
conclusion in Monegasque was that the Convention's only limitation on
procedural rules was "the requirement that the procedures applied in
foreign cases would not be substantially more onerous than those applied
in domestic cases.
'56
As a practical matter, one might question whether the effects of
forum non conveniens and minimum contacts is indeed more onerous for
awards rendered abroad. In a purely domestic context, when both sides
are American and have all of their property within the United States, a
dismissal in one forum usually does no more than send the award
creditor to another state.
By contrast, dismissal may have more disagreeable results in cases
that implicate more than one country. In multinational transactions with
parties from different countries, assets may be spread throughout the
world, sometimes in jurisdictions with financial secrecy statutes. Any
attempt to secure enforcement in the United States requires that a
motion for confirmation be made during the three-year window provided
by the FAA.57 Otherwise, the award may not be recognized in the event
that the award loser later brings assets into the country.f Refusal to
recognize the award could prove fatal to the winner's chances of making
55. Monegasque de Reassurances, S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukr., 3"1 F.3 d 488, 494 (2d Cir.
2002).
56. Id. at 496.
57. 9 U.S.C. § 207.
58. For a case in which the failure to act within the three-year limit barred award recognition, see
Seetransport, 989 F.2d at 581, discussed supra note 54.
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the award effective, since at that time there may be no other options
inside the United States. The property hidden in foreign jurisdictions will
be safely kept outside the country until the fourth year after the award
was made.
2. Drafting History
In concluding that the New York Convention imposes no limitations
(other than non-discrimination) on procedural rules at the enforcement
forum, the Second Circuit seems to have gone astray as a matter of both
logic and history. In relying on the drafting history of the New York
Convention, the court suggested that the non-discrimination language
was proposed by Belgium, and supported by the United States, only after
efforts to establish uniform standards had failed."
However, history does not support the Second Circuit's conclusions.
To the contrary, the debate on Article III confirms that the reference to
"rules of procedure" relates simply to formalities for an application to
confirm or enforce, including fees and the pro forma structure of the
request. There is no evidence that the language was intended to
incorporate doctrines that permit or require courts to prune their dockets
in normal commercial litigation.
As an initial matter, it is important to remember that the relevant
language in Convention Article III originated not with the Belgian
delegate, 6° or any other delegate, but was instead taken verbatim from
the predecessor to the New York Convention.6' Article I of the 1927
Geneva Arbitration Convention provided that "an arbitral award...
shall be recognized as binding and shall be enforced in accordance with





In contrast, the Belgian proposal that the Second Circuit referred to
would have resulted in a substantially different version of the New York
Convention. Each country would have enforced foreign arbitral awards
in the identical manner as for domestic awards.
63
59. The chief source of the Second Circuit's information seems to have been a law review article,
Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1o49 (1961).
6o. Indeed, the comments of the Belgian delegate actually run counter to the argument that
Article III of the draft Convention was concerned principally with making the award operative. "In
reply to the French representative, he explained that the procedures which, under the Belgian
proposal, would be identical with those for national awards included not only the modalities of
enforcement but also those necessary to secure enforcement, such as the rules governing the
presentation of documents." U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.io, at 7 (May 27, 1958).
61. VAN DEN BERG, supra note 34, at 234.
62. 1927 Geneva Convention, supra note 42, art. I.
63. See U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.io, at 5 ("Mr. Herment (Belgium) said that the rules of
procedure governing the two types of award should be not only comparable but identical. The articles
should therefore state explicitly that once it had been established that a foreign award met the
requirements of the Convention, the r6gime applicable to its enforcement, including the issue of the
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More significantly, the comments from delegates most closely
involved with the adoption of the present Convention wording show an
expectation at odds with the Second Circuit's interpretation of that
article. For example, the representative from the United Kingdom
(author of the prohibition on fees more onerous than those applicable to
domestic awards) explained that the purpose of his proposal was to
ensure that a foreign award that met the conditions of the Convention
should be "enforceable without unnecessary inconvenience."6 Similarly,
the report of the Secretary General of the United Nations' Economic and
Social Council highlights that reference to "rules of procedure" was not
an attempt to incorporate by reference all of the arcane rules of
procedure applicable in each jurisdiction in which the Convention would
be applicable, but rather to refer to the basic method by which a party
must file an application to have an arbitral award recognized or
enforced.6'
Thus, the Convention's drafting history indicates that it was not
meant to authorize courts to provide open-ended grounds on which to
dismiss recognition of otherwise valid awards. To the contrary, the
prevailing view supports the exclusivity of the reasons for refusal of
recognition as set forth in Convention Articles V and VI, which relate to
basic procedural fairness, substantive public policy and adjournment in
deference to foreign court proceedings. 6 Although a Convention country
enforcement order, would be the one governing domestic awards.").
64. Id. at 7 (referring to comments of Mr. Wortley).
65. The Secretary-General, Note on the Comments on Draft Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards of March 6, 1958, 1$ 7-8, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/2 (Mar. 6,
1958). The relevant passage of the Secretary General's remarks reads as follows:
Some of the Governments and organizations pointed out the desirability of supplementing
Article [III] of the Convention either (a) by including in it standard procedural rules that
would be applicable to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards, (b) by providing that
arbitral awards should be enforced by a "summary procedure", or (c) by stipulating that the
arbitral awards recognized pursuant to the Convention should be enforceable by the same
procedure as that applied to domestic arbitral awards. [citation omitted] The object of such
provisions would be to preclude the possibility that the enforcement of foreign awards may
be delayed or rendered impractical because of unduly complicated enforcement procedures.
Each of the above proposals may give rise to some difficulties: (a) it may not be considered
practical to attempt spelling out the applicable enforcement procedures in all detail in the
text of the Convention itself; (b) a reference to "summary" enforcement procedures may
not be given an identical meaning in countries with different procedural law systems; and
(c) the procedures applicable to the enforcement of domestic arbitral awards may contain
elements which, if applied to foreign awards, would make the enforcement too cumbersome
or time-consuming. A possible solution to these difficulties may be to provide in Article
[III] of the draft Convention that arbitral awards recognized pursuant to the Convention
should be enforced in accordance with a simplified and expeditious procedure which, in any
event, should not be more onerous than that applied to domestic arbitral awards.
Id.
66. Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., 126 F.3d 15, 23 (2d Cir. 1997) ("[Tlhe
Convention is equally clear that when an action for enforcement is brought in a foreign state, the state
may refuse to enforce the award only on the grounds explicitly set forth in Article V of the
Convention."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 488
cmt. a (1987) ("The defenses to enforcement of a foreign arbitral award set forth in [Art. V of the
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can certainly set up ministerial conditions for award enforcement, such as
making the application to the correct court or paying a reasonable filing
fee, the Convention drafters did not expect the recognition forum would
establish outright procedural bars to award confirmation.
3. The United States Implementing Legislation
Chapter 2 of the FAA, which implements the New York
Convention, supplies an additional element in understanding the scope
of any latent exceptions to award recognition based on domestic
procedural rules.6 As discussed below, the most sensible conclusion to be
drawn from this legislation is that the "rules of procedure" language in
Convention Article III was not intended to serve as a tool for escape
from the duty to recognize otherwise valid arbitration awards.
In adopting the Convention, the United States added a second
chapter to the FAA, which states explicitly that a federal court "shall
confirm the award unless it finds one of the grounds for refusal or
deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award" specified in the
New York Convention.6 The Convention's grounds for non-recognition
include basic procedural fairness and public policy, but not local rules of
civil procedure applicable in normal commercial litigation.
Even absent this legislation, however, good arguments exist for
reading the Convention to exclude invocation of national procedural
rules that vitiate arbitration awards. To allow an open-ended escape
hatch creates the anomalous situation of a nation obtaining treaty
benefits for its own awards abroad, while denying enforcement to foreign
awards simply by maintaining national rules that refuse to enforce any
awards, whether foreign or domestic.
Possibly for this reason, the treaty contains its own explicit provision
on non-recognition of awards.69 The enumerated defenses have
traditionally been considered to be exhaustive.' Had the Convention
wished to provide the debtor with an option to raise additional
roadblocks to implementation of the award, this would normally have
been done with the addition of another line in the litany of Article V
defenses, one providing for the invalidity of awards not in conformity
with the law of the recognition forum.
4. Analogies to Federalism Consideration
Analogies to the interaction of federal and state arbitration law are
Convention] are exclusive.").
67. See ILC Report, supra note 1o, at I.
68. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2oo6).
69. New York Convention, supra note 14, art. V.
70. See also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 488
cmt. a ("The defenses to enforcement of a foreign arbitral award set forth in [Article V of the
Convention] are exclusive.").
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interesting, but inconclusive. The FAA treats an arbitration agreement
like any other contract provision, by making it valid "save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."'"
Since no federal common law of contracts exists,7" this requires validity
determinations according to state law principles.
Federal case law, however, has consistently held that enforcement of
arbitration agreements may not be circumvented by state rules designed
to invalidate arbitration clauses.73 A state might perhaps require that all
contracts be written in capital letters and underlined, but could not enact
a statute providing that only arbitration clauses must be in capitals.
Admittedly, nothing in the rules related to forum non conveniens or
personal jurisdiction aims specifically at arbitration awards. In practice,
however, the application of these doctrines to arbitration conducted
abroad has the effect of making such awards less reliable than awards
rendered in the United States.
Another federalism analogy relates to the state enforcement of
federally-created rights. While state courts may address such questions,
they may not do so in a way that impinges upon vindication of the
substantive federal claim.74 Similarly, the idiosyncrasies of national court
should not distort the recognition of treaty claims.
5. The Three-Year Rule
As mentioned earlier, the FAA requires confirmation within three
years of the date an award is made.7' Normally, this condition serves
sensible ends. Court scrutiny relatively soon after arbitral proceedings
permits the creation of a record when documents and witnesses are still
available and before recollections become stale, thus increasing the
commercial community's confidence that arbitration will not be a lottery
of erratic results.
In some instances, however, this timing prerequisite could yield
untoward results if courts persist in denial of recognition for lack of
71. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
72. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (938) ("There is no federal common law.").
73. See Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 68I, 687 (t996) (Montana may not enact
legislation designed specifically to invalidate arbitration clause); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v.
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281-82 (1995) (reversing an Alabama state court decision holding that the FAA
did not apply to an arbitration clause in a termite prevention contract); Southland Corp. v. Keating,
465 U.S. i, to (1984) (federal arbitration statute applied even with respect to claims under state
regulatory regimes); Doctor's Associates, Inc. v. Hamilton, 15o F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 1998); Sec. Indus.
Ass'n v. Connolly, 883 F.2d 1114, 1121 (ist Cir. 1989) (state regulations limiting the right of securities
brokers to require form arbitration agreements). See generally Alan Scott Rau, The UNCITRAL
Model Law in State and Federal Courts: The Case of Waiver, 6 Am. REV. INT'L ARB. 223 (1995).
74. See Brown v. W. Ry. of Ala., 338 U.S. 294, 298-99 (949) (citing Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S.
22, 24 (1923)); see also Note, State Enforcement of Federally Created Rights, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1551,
756o-6i S n6o).
75. See supra note 53-
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"minimum contacts" or by reason of forum non conveniens. Non-
recognition creates the peril that the winner in the arbitration may find
attachable property only when it is too late, 6 after the loser has kept its
assets out of the United States for a safe period. In such instances, the
winner will need a confirmed award in advance of the moment when
property is present.
To meet such legitimate commercial concerns, the award
enforcement should be modified to include a two-step process. First,
confirmation hearing should be available in a centralized national forum
such as the Court of International Trade (CIT). Thereafter, federal
district courts would exercise their present enforcement functions, as
long as the creditor had obtained a judicial imprimatur on the foreign
award within the three-year statutory period.
The aim of the proposal is to encourage recognition actions within a
reasonable time following the arbitration, but not permit gamesmanship
that penalizes prevailing claimants. Precedent for such a compromise
solution can be found in New York Convention Article V(i)(e), which
provides that awards vacated at the arbitral situs "may" (not "must") be
refused enforcement, and explicitly allows application of whatever
applicable national law might prove more favorable to the party seeking
award enforcement.' These rules encourage a robust exchange on award
validity at the arbitral situs relatively soon after the arbitrator's decision
has been announced, but without denying later consideration of the
award's integrity when appropriate."' A similarly flexible principle would
seem appropriate with respect to the time available for award
76. See, e.g., Seetransport Wiking Trader v. Navimpex Centrala, 989 F.2d 572 (2d Cir. 1993),
discussed supra note 54.
77. New York Convention, supra note 14, arts. V(s)(e), VII. Thus courts outside the country of
arbitration are generally free either to recognize the arbitral award or to deny recognition and thereby
give effect to the annulment. By contrast, the European Arbitration Convention (Geneva 196i) takes
a different approach, permitting non-recognition of annulled awards only if vacated on specific
grounds listed in the Convention. European Convention on International Commercial Arbitration of
1961 art. IX(2), Apr. 21, 1961, 484 U.N.T.S. 364. These "approved" grounds for vacatur mirror the
non-recognition standards found in New York Convention Article V(i)(a)-(d), related to matters
such as lack of notice, excess of jurisdiction, and improper constitution of the arbitral tribunal.
78. Nevertheless, situations do arise when recognition of annulled awards might be appropriate.
For example, the vacatur action at the arbitral situs might itself be tainted by impropriety, thus the use
of a permissive "may" in the Convention. See supra note 77 and accompanying text. In a decision by
the High Court of South Africa in Telkom SA Ltd. v. Anthony Boswood, International Chamber of
Commerce & Telcordia Technologies Inc., a contract between a South African company and an
American corporation contained a clause providing for arbitration under the ICC Rules. The South
African court vacated an award in favor of the American party and in the same decision went on to
disregard the ICC appointment process (requiring an arbitrator of neutral nationality unless otherwise
agreed) in favor of naming a new arbitral tribunal composed of three South African arbitrators, all
proposed by the South African respondent that had just moved to vacate the award. In connection
with an attempt to have the South African award recognized in the United States, see Telcordia
Technologies v. Telkom SA Ltd., 95 F. App'x 361, 362-63 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
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enforcement.
6. Practice of Other Nations
The practice of countries other than the United States provides little
support for the acceptance of local procedural impediments to
enforcement of New York Convention awards. Except for claims against
foreign sovereigns,79  few non-American jurisdictions condition
enforcement of Convention awards on a link with the transaction, the
parties or their property8" Many Western legal systems exercise
jurisdiction without regard to the type of minimum contacts required by
the United States,8 ' and international law generally prohibits invocation
of a country's internal law to eviscerate its international agreement.2
79. Questions of sovereign immunity pose different concerns, since the objection of the
respondent state relates to jurisdiction under principle of international (not just local) law. For
example, before Swiss courts will execute an award against the assets of a foreign sovereign, an
"internal connection" (Binnenbeziehung) must exist between Switzerland and either the parties or the
transaction. See Circulaire du Ddpartment f6d6ral de justice et police, Nov. 26, 1979, 226-27
Jurisprudence des autorit~s administratives de la Conf6d~ration No. 224. The principle was applied to
one aspect of the LIAMCO saga. See Socialist Libyan Arab Popular Jamarihiya v. Libyan American
Oil Co., Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Court] June i9, I98O , 20 I.L.M. 155, 159-6o (Switz.); Georges
R. Delaume, Economic Development and Sovereign Immunity, AM. J. INT'L L. 319, 340 (1985). For
earlier precedents, see Royaume de Grece v. Banque Julius Bar et Cie., BGer [Federal Court], June 6,
1956, 82 Arrts du Tribunal F6d6ral Suisse I 75, 23 I.L.R. 195 (Switz.). Although the award in Libya
was made within Switzerland (at the arbitral seat in Geneva) the New York Convention would still
apply to an award "not considered as domestic" pursuant to Convention Article I.
80. Cf New York City Bar Report, supra note 29, at 6-7, which suggests that several countries
(including China and Japan) impose such restrictions. The authors' own reading of the cited
authorities, however, leads to a more nuanced conclusion. General principals of judicial jurisdiction
and service of process do not necessarily control in situations governed by an international treaty.
Moreover, the Report itself notes that the laws of many countries (including France, Germany, Italy
and Sweden) enforce awards notwithstanding the absence of connection between the award debtor or
his property and any particular location within the forum. Id. at 7 n.26. As a practical matter, of
course, it is difficult to prove the negative. One is not likely to find court decisions stating, "We
enforce this award even though it has nothing to do with our forum."
8I. See French Code Civil Art. 14 C. civ. [Fr.] (jurisdiction based on the nationality of the
plaintiff); German ZivilprozeBordnung [ZPO] [civil procedure statute] Art. 23 (Ger.) (jurisdiction on
the basis of property alone); English CPR Part 6.20 (jurisdiction based on applicable substantive law).
Compare the position in Switzerland, where the applicability of Swiss law requires courts to accept
jurisdiction in the context of a forum selection clause. See Art. 5, Loi f~d~rale sur le droit international
prive; see also § IO62 ZPO (providing simply that when awards are made outside Germany,
enforcement competence lies with the Berlin Kammergericht (Higher Regional Court) when the party
resisting enforcement has no residence or place of business in Germany).
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 311(3)
(1987). For a discussion of a related (but conceptually distinct) point, see Jan Paulsson, May a State
Invoke its Internal Law to Repudiate Consent to International Commercial Arbitration?, 2 ARB. INT'L 90
(1986).
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II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF TREATY OBLIGATIONS
A. AWARD RECOGNITION AND FOREIGN DEFENDANTS
i. Due Process: Minimum Contacts with the Forum State
During the first fifteen years after the United States ratified the New
York Convention, no reported cases addressed whether a court must
have personal jurisdiction over an award debtor in order to entertain a
petition to recognize or enforce a Convention Award.s8 In 1985, however,
a federal court decision stated that the FAA does not give courts power
over all persons throughout the world who have entered into an
arbitration agreement covered by the Convention."' Rather, some basis
must be shown, "whether arising from the respondent's residence, his
conduct, his consent, the location or his property or otherwise," to justify
subjecting that person to the court's power.8
5
Since that time, the view that Constitutional due process requires
personal jurisdiction over an arbitration's loser (or its assets) has gained
considerable momentum. As discussed below, this general principle
requires greater elaboration, particularly when assets are not present in
the state where the district court is located, or the sole basis for personal
jurisdiction might lie in the presence of such assets.
In adjudicating cases that involve foreign defendants, courts in the
United States must conform to Constitutional requirements for
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. These derive from the
prohibition on deprivation of property without "due process of law"
found in the Fifth Amendment (imposed directly on federal courts) and
the Fourteenth Amendment (imposed on state courts).
86
83. The FAA has resolved the question of federal subject matter jurisdiction (whether questions
pertaining to the New York Convention must be decided in the federal courts) through provisions that
give federal courts independent subject matter jurisdiction in all actions falling under the New York or
Panama Convention. 9 U.S.C. §§ 203,301, 302 (2006). In addition, pursuant to FAA § 205, parties may
remove to federal court cases brought in state courts with respect to awards falling under the New
York or Panama Convention. No similar independent subject matter jurisdiction exists for actions
falling under FAA Chapter i, although some courts have deemed a federal question to exist by virtue
of federal securities law claims raised in the underlying arbitration. See Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns &
Co.. 22o F.3 d 22, 25 (2d Cir. 2000).
84. Transatlantic Bulk Shipping v. Saudi Chartering, 622 F. Supp. 25, 26-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1985),
arose from a ship time charter in which a Liberian company (Transatlantic) attempted unsuccessfully
to enforce an award made in London against a Panamanian company with principal place of business
in Greece (Saudi Chartering). The court found that Saudi Chartering had no offices, bank accounts,
employees, or agents in New York, and did not transact business in New York. Id. at 26; see also
Italtrade International USA L.L.C. v. Sri Lanka Cement Corp., No. Civ.A.oo-2458, 2002 WL 59399, at
*2 (E.D. La. Jan. 15, 2002) (citing Transatlantic Bulk Shipping, 622 F. Supp. 25). See generally GARY B.
BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 885 (2d ed. 2001) ("[I]t is not clear whether the
FAA's second chapter contains a statutory grant of personal jurisdiction.").
85. Transatlantic Bulk Shipping, 622 F. Supp. at 27.
86. U. S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § . The prevailing view now appears to be that
foreign states and their instrumentalities, like the states of the union, are not persons within the
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Due process, of course, is an elastic and ill-defined notion, not unlike
concepts such as justice and equity. The principles underlying the due
process limits on personal jurisdiction relate to fairness, legitimacy, and
consent. Content must be supplied on a case-by-case basis, and will vary
according to the context in which it is invoked. Outside jurisdictional
analysis, due process has also been pressed into service in connection
with enforcement of foreign judgments8' and forum non conveniens
analysis. 8 On occasion, due process includes substantive (rather than
procedural) safeguards of life, liberty, and property, as well as
fundamental constraints on governmental power.8
In the context of civil litigation, the United States Supreme Court
has interpreted due process to permit adjudication of a foreign
defendant's rights only if the defendant has "minimum contacts" with the
forum such that the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294
F.3d 82, 99-tOO (D.C. Cir. 2002); see also TMR Energy, Ltd. v. State Prop. Fund of Ukr., 41 i F.3d 296,
305 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (enforcing award made in Sweden against agent of Ukraine government).
Therefore the enforcement of awards against foreign states or their instrumentalities implicate a
different legal posture from those arising with respect to private respondents. For a recent discussion
of this subject, see S.I. Strong, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards Against Foreign States or State
Agencies, 26 Nw. J. INT'L L & Bus. 335 (2006). One consequence may well be that by signing an
arbitration agreement, states make themselves subject to enforcement in the United States irrespective
of assets here or business contacts. For an earlier perspective on the matter, see Creighton Ltd. v.
Gov't of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d i18, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding it "implausible" that Qatar, by
agreeing to arbitrate in France, should be deemed to have waived its right to challenge personal
jurisdiction in the United States).
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 482(i)(a)
provides for denial of recognition to a foreign judgment "rendered under a judicial system that does
not provide impartial tribunals or procedures compatible with due process of law." Commentary
provides examples of denial of due process, including: a judiciary dominated by political branches of
government or an opposing litigant, inability to obtain counsel, to secure documents, or to secure
attendance of a witness and lack of appellate review. § 482 cmt. b. A judicial system may fail in a
general way (e.g., the treatment of Jews in Nazi Germany) or in a particular case (e.g., lack of notice to
a particular respondent). § 482 cmts. a, b; see also UNIFORM FOREIGN MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION
AcT, § 4. Compare UNIFORM FOREIGN-COUNTRY MONEY JUDGMENTS RECOGNITION ACT (2005) (not yet
adopted in any state) which also provides in section 4, subsections (c)(7) & (8) for non-recognition of a
foreign-country judgment rendered in "circumstances that raise substantial doubt about the integrity
of the rendering court" or where "the specific proceeding in the foreign court" was not compatible
with the requirements of due process of law.
88. Courts in the United States that consider foreign litigation procedures at odds with American
notions of due process might find a foreign tribunal inadequate as an alternative forum, and thus
refuse to dismiss actions on forum non conveniens grounds. See, e.g., Nemariam v. Ethiopia, 315 F.3d
390, 395 (D.C. Cir. 2003), discussed in Case Comment by Ryan T. Bergsieker, International Tribunals
and Forum Non Conveniens Analysis, 114 YALE L.J. 443 (2004). Ethiopia had moved to dismiss an
action by an expelled Eritrean merchant whose assets had allegedly been confiscated by Ethiopia,
arguing that the suit should be heard in the Claims Commission established pursuant to the 2000 peace
treaty between Eritrea and Ethiopia (text at 40 I.L.M. 260). Id. at 445.
89. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. II3 (973) (abortion); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(t965) (advice on contraceptives); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (I9O5) (limits on employees'
work hours).
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and substantial justice."'  Even where a court finds that "minimum
contacts" exist, due process dictates that an exercise of jurisdiction must
be reasonable.'
Although enforcement of foreign arbitral awards normally falls to
the federal courts,92 Constitutional restrictions applicable to states
sometimes find their way into the story. In diversity actions, federal
courts normally look to a state's "long-arm" statute in determining
personal jurisdiction,93  which in turn implicates the Fourteenth
Amendment.94 This two-part analysis is often collapsed, since many states
have adopted jurisdictional analysis (either statutory or through court
interpretation) designed to extend jurisdiction to the limits allowed by
the Constitution.95 Whether the inquiry proceeds in one step or two,
however, the "minimum contacts" must normally be with the state in
which the federal court is located."
State law may have an impact even in federal question cases, where
the constitutional limits of personal jurisdiction are fixed by the Fifth
9o. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457, 463 (940)).
91. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (i98o); see also Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987) (applying reasonableness test to find no jurisdiction
over Japanese valve manufacturer in indemnity claim brought by Taiwanese tire-tube manufacturer,
when the forum state had no substantial interest in sustaining jurisdiction over the action); Burger
King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (placing burden of proof on defendant to prove that
exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable).
92. See 9 U.S.C. § 205 (2oo6).
93. 28 U.S.C. § 1652; FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k). For some of the federalism concerns that lead to this
result. See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
94- See FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(I)(A) (permitting service of summons over defendants subject to
courts of general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located); see also Glencore Grain
Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1123 (9th Cir. 2002).
95. For example, the Massachusetts long-arm statute, MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3 (2oo6), has
been held to authorize jurisdiction to the limits allowed by the Federal Constitution. "Automatic"
Sprinkler Corp. of America v. Seneca Foods Corp., 28o N.E.2d 423, 424 (Mass. 1972). In particular,
MAsS. GEN. LAWS ch. 223A, § 3, as amended by St. 1993, ch. 46o, § 86, provides in pertinent part:
A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly or by an agent,
as to a cause of action in law or equity arising from the person's (a) transacting any business
in this commonwealth; (b) contracting to supply services or things in this commonwealth;
(c) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this commonwealth; (d) causing tortious
injury in this commonwealth by an act or omission outside this commonwealth if he
regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of conduct, or
derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in this
commonwealth; (e) having an interest in, using or possessing real property in this
commonwealth; ... (g) maintaining a domicile in this commonwealth while a party to a
personal . . . relationship out of which arises a claim for . . . parentage of a child, child
support or child custody; or the commission of any act giving rise to such a claim; or (h)
having been subject to the exercise of personal jurisdiction of a court of the commonwealth
which has resulted in an order of... custody ... [or] child support ... notwithstanding the
subsequent departure of one of the original parties from the commonwealth, if the action
involves modification of such order or orders and the moving party resides in the
commonwealth, or if the action involves enforcement of such order notwithstanding the
domicile of the moving party.
96. One possible exception lies in FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), discussed infra Part II.A.2.
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Amendment and claimants need show only the existence of adequate
contacts with the United States as a whole. However, some basis for
service of process must exist in a federal statute or rule of civil
procedure. Thus, personal jurisdiction becomes intertwined with rules on
service of process, given that the latter constitutes the vehicle by which a
court obtains jurisdiction.97 Normally, service of process is effective to
establish jurisdiction only for defendants within the territorial limits of
the state in which the court sits, unless a federal statute otherwise permits
nationwide or extraterritorial service."5
When the respondent is a foreign sovereign, some courts have
attempted to rely on provisions of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
(FSIA) to establish personal jurisdiction.' The FSIA grants personal
jurisdiction over foreign states when the court possesses subject matter
jurisdiction under one of the exceptions to foreign sovereign immunity
provided, including an action to enforce an arbitration award.'" Even so,
courts applying the FSIA have been careful to find "minimum contacts"
with the United States as a whole, sufficient to satisfy due process
requirements."'
Well-established law holds that objections to lack of personal
jurisdiction can be waived, either expressly or by implication based on
prior conduct.' 2 In Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the United States
Supreme Court noted that because personal jurisdiction rights are
waivable, "a variety of legal arrangements" exist by which a litigant may
97. United Elec. Radio & Mach. Workers v. 163 Pleasant St. Corp., 960 F.2d io8o, 1095 (ist Cir.
1992). In a union lawsuit against an employer and its Scottish parent corporation (International Twist
Drill Holdings), alleging cessation of health care payments after closing local facilities would violate
inter alia Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the court reversed the district court's refusal to
dismiss action to pierce the veil between the Scottish parent and a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Massachusetts. Id.
98. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(I); cf. FED. R. Clv. P. 4(k)(2) (allowing service based on contacts with the
United States as a whole). See generally U.S. v. Swiss Am. Bank, Ltd., 274 F.3d 61o, 627 (Ist Cir. 2001)
(denying jurisdiction in an action brought by the United States against a foreign financial institution to
recover drug proceeds forfeited to the United States pursuant to the RICO Act).
99. See, e.g., Seetransport Wiking Trader v. Navimpex Centrala, 989 F.2d 572, 574 (2d Cir. 1993)
(addressing enforcement of an ICC award rendered in Paris). While jurisdiction to enforce the award
was found to exist, the motion was refused on the basis that more than three years had elapsed from
when the award was made and when it was presented for enforcement. Id. at 583. The court left open
whether a Paris judicial decision confirming the award would be enforceable in its own right. Id.
ioo. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602-11 (2oo6). Section 133o(b) provides that "[p]ersonal jurisdiction
over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district courts have
jurisdiction under subsection (a) where service has been made under section 16o8 of this title." Under
§ 16o8, several methods of service are permissible, including the use of mail requiring signed receipt.
On jurisdiction under the FSIA, see Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
Iot. In Seetransport, the court of appeals emphasized that the district court had found "minimum
contacts" existed between the United States and the Romanian state entity in the form of solicitation
of business to sell goods of various state-owned entities, including Navimpex. 989 F.2d at 580.
102. The most obvious method of waiving an objection to jurisdiction is in a forum selection clause
in a written contract. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585, 589 (I99i).
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give "express or implied consent" to the court's personal jurisdiction."
No sound policy reason prevents such a principle from being applied to
international arbitration.
2. Nationwide Contacts
The need for federal courts to borrow state long-arm statutes creates
an irony in the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards. Given that
award confirmation proceeds pursuant to a federal statute,"°4 one might
expect the measuring rod for "minimum contacts" to be the United
States as a whole. Surprisingly, however, the majority view has been that
federal courts must borrow the state statute in "lock step" with the state
itself, imposing the Fourteenth Amendment limitations based on
contacts with the forum state only."
In response to such anomalies, the United States Supreme Court
promulgated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2), applicable when
federal courts exercise jurisdiction based on a federal question, which
would be the case for enforcement of New York Convention awards."°
When a foreign defendant has contacts nationally to justify personal
jurisdiction, then service of process may be effective to establish personal
jurisdiction, notwithstanding insufficient contacts with any one state.
Jurisdiction must, however, always be "consistent with the
Constitution."l'
The use of Rule 4(k)(2) was raised in an intriguing case involving
103. 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985) (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee,
456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982)); see also M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). Earlier
the court in Ins. Corp. of Jr. stated that the requirement of personal jurisdiction may be intentionally
waived, and for various reasons "a defendant may be estopped from raising the issue." Ins. Corp. of
lr., 456 U.S. at 704. The court cited with approval a Second Circuit decision holding such waiver to be
implicit in an agreement to arbitrate. Id. (citing Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354 (2d Cir. 1964)).
104. Award enforcement in federal district courts is based on the FAA. 9 U.S.C. § 203.
105. See Omni Capital Int'l Ltd. v. Rudolf Wolff & Co., 484 U.S. 97, 107-08 (1987). See generally
LOUISE ELLEN TEITZ, TRANSNATIONAL LMGATON 37-38 (I996).
io6. See 9 U.S.C. §203. By contrast, it has been held that no "federal question" jurisdiction exists
for enforcement of domestic (non-Convention) awards, which must normally be based on the
existence of diversity of citizenship. See PCS 2oo0 LP v. Romulus Telecomm., 148 F.3d 32, 34 (ist Cir.
1998). Application of the FAA does not in itself create a federal question. Id. Thus the FAA is an
anomaly in that it creates a body of federal law without creating any basis for federal court
jurisdiction, except in international cases. Id.; see also Greenberg v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 220 F.3 d 22,
25-26 (2d Cir. 2000); Kasap v. Folger Nolan Fleming & Douglas, 166 F.3d 1243, 1245-46 (D.C. Cir.
1999). In some cases, however, an underlying federal law claim may create jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Greenberg, 220 F.3d at 26-27 (holding that a federal allegation that arbitrator "manifestly
disregarded" federal securities laws provided an independent jurisdictional basis).
107. FED. R. CIv. P. 4 (k)(2). The claimant may not, however, pick any state at random. Id. Rule
4(k)(2) operates only if personal jurisdiction is absent in courts of general jurisdiction "of any state."
Id. Thus, for example, if jurisdiction clearly existed in California, a claimant could not use the rule to
create jurisdiction in the Federal District Court in Massachusetts. On the uncertainties of who bears
the burden of proof in this regard, see TErTZ, supra note I05, at 39-46.
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awards rendered in Stockholm sought to be enforced against two Ruqsian
companies."" The district court had dismissed an application to confirm
the awards, based on its finding that personal jurisdiction was lacking
over the two foreign entities. The court of appeals, however, noted that it
had never expressly ruled on the question of whether foreign award
enforcement required personal jurisdiction over the respondent or its
property.
The court went on to state, however, that it might not be necessary
to reach that difficult issue, since several alternative theories of
jurisdiction had been advanced. These included consent to the district
court jurisdiction (based on language in the arbitration clause) and Rule
4(k)(2), permitting suit based on contacts with the United States as a
whole when personal jurisdiction exists in no one state.
On both of these issues, the court of appeals remanded the case to
the district court for appropriate findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The case then settled before these determinations were made."
3. Lessons from SHAFFER v. HEITNER
As mentioned earlier, for all cases heard in United States courts a
minimum connection must exist between the defendant and the state
where the court is sitting."
Ownership of assets in the state might be indicative of minimum
connection, but the mere presence of property is not dispositive of
whether the Constitutional standard has been met."' Thus, courts must
evaluate the totality of contacts with the defendant.
An action to confirm a New York Convention award, however, is
fundamentally different from a normal action for recovery of money.
When an award creditor files an action to have an award recognized, the
merits of the dispute have already been decided. The court is not asked
to decide whether another party breached its contract. That matter has
already been adjudicated by the arbitrator, whose award is final.
Rather, the job of a court asked to recognize an arbitral award is to
determine whether the parties received the process for which they
bargained. For international cases, this implicates a number of special
108. Dardana Ltd. v. A.O. Yuganskneftegaz, 317 F-3d 202 (2d Cir. 2003).
io9. For a recent case on nationwide contacts, see Mwani v. Osama Bin Laden, 417 F.3d I (D.C.
Cir. 2005). Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, Kenyan victims of bombing outside American embassy
brought action against terrorists and terrorist organizations for orchestrating the bombing. Id. at 4-5.
The Court held service of process and personal jurisdiction over terrorists valid, and found
Afghanistan's alleged conduct did not constitute a "commercial activity" sufficient to meet the
commercial exception to sovereign immunity. Id. at 8-17; see also In re Terrorist Attacks on Sept. I I,
2001, 392 F. Supp. 2d 539 (D.N.Y. 2005) (dismissing actions against Saudi officials who did not have
minimum contacts with the United States).
I Io. See, e.g., Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945).
iii. Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 210 (1977).
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questions. Was there an arbitration agreement?" 2 Were the arbitrators
honest?"3 Did the loser have an opportunity to present its case?"4 Does
the award violate some fundamental public policy?"5
Consequently, the FAA explicitly provides that federal courts "shall
confirm the award unless [they find] one of the grounds for refusal or
deferral of recognition or enforcement of the award" specified in the
New York Convention. I,6 Therefore, petitions to recognize Convention
awards are routinely granted except in the rare cases where the
respondent proves one of the narrow defenses in Convention
Article V."7
In this context, the U.S: Supreme 'Court's reasoning in Shaffer v.
Heitner might well be the best authority for the proposition that the
contacts necessary to enforce a Convention award are not the same as
those required in deciding the merits of a normal commercial dispute."8
In Shaffer, a shareholder derivative action against officers of a Delaware
corporation alleged breach of duties that caused corporate liability for
damages and a fine in an antitrust suit. At the time, a state statute
permitted Delaware courts to take quasi in rem jurisdiction by
sequestering the defendants' property in the state, including corporate
stock. The U.S. Supreme Court found the minimum contacts test from
International Shoe should be applicable to such proceedings, and held the
attached property insufficient to support jurisdiction over defendants
who had conducted no business in the state.
The majority opinion, per Justice Thurgood Marshall, considered
the Constitutional requirements for enforcement of judgments already
rendered in a foreign jurisdiction. Concluding in footnote 36 that the
normal due process considerations did not obtain in such a context, the
Court noted that:
Once it has been determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that
the defendant is a debtor of the plaintiff, there would seem to be no
unfairness in allowing an action to realize on that debt in a state where
the defendant has property, whether or not that State would have
112. See New York Convention, supra note 14, art. V(i)(a).
I13. See id. art. v(n)(b).
154. See id. art. v(i)(b).
115. See id. art. v(u)(b).
116. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2oo6) (emphasis added).
117. See Yusuf Ahmed Alghanim & Sons v. Toys "R" Us, Inc., I26 F.3d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1997).
Indeed, Section 6 of the FAA provides that any application to a court to confirm or enforce an arbitral
award "shall be made and heard in the manner provided by law for the making and hearing of motions
.... (and not by service of a summons and complaint) except as otherwise indicated in the statute. 9
U.S.C. § 6; see also Health Serv. Mgmt. Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253, 1257-58 (7th Cir. 1992).
1I8. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
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jurisdiction to determine the existence of the debt as an original
matter."9
This footnote, of course, was written in the context of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution, which requires courts of one
state to recognize judgments of another.'20 Clearly, no perfect analogy
exists between a state court judgment and a New York Convention
award.
The similarities between the two types of decisions (award and
judgment) are, however, more important than their differences. In an
action to enforce a sister-state judgment, the respondent still has an
important defense: that the court deciding the merits lacked personal
jurisdiction. As Professor Linda Silberman has rightly noted,
"[c]onfirmation and enforcement of an arbitral award are the equivalent
of the enforcement of a judgment for purposes of the Shaffer
distinction." ....
Reliance on the teachings of Shaffer might be questioned because
the discussion of judgment execution was dictum. However, to attack
footnote 36 because it was not necessary to the holding of the case would
be very odd indeed. Some of the most enduring principles of American
law have come from dicta in footnotes. One thinks of the long shadow
cast on civil rights litigation by the dictum in the Carolene Products
decision, providing a special scope of judicial attention for cases
implicating "prejudice against discrete and insular minorities' ....
Likewise, the well-established American doctrine that arbitral awards
may be reviewed for "manifest disregard of the law" derives from dictum
in the long-since overruled case of Wilko v. Swan.'23 Dictum has become
a cornerstone of judicial review of arbitration awards rendered in the
United States.'24
In any event, Shaffer must be read in the context of the Supreme
Court's decision in Burnham v. Superior Court, which questions certain
119. Id. at 2o n.36.
120. U.S. CONST., art. iv, § i ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof.").
121. Silberman, supra note 28, at 15; see also William W. Park, Amending the Federal Arbitration
Act, 13 AM. REv. INT'L ARB. 75, 99-100 (2002).
122. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938).
123. 346 U.S. 427, 436-37 (1953). The holding of the case, that securities law issues were non-
arbitrable, was progressively overruled in a line of cases ending with Rodriguez de Quijas v.
Shearson/American Exp., Inc., 490 U.S. 477,485 (1989).
124. Whether this should be so is another matter. To note the influence of dictum is not to be in
agreement with its effect. For example, many would view the "manifest disregard" doctrine as
unnecessary, pointing out that awards which violate public policy can be set aside under New York
Convention Article V(I)(b), and that such public policy analysis has done a fine job in Continental
Europe in addressing the decisions of arbitrators who have strayed too far from their reservations.
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aspects of Shaffer unrelated to footnote 36."5' When read in context, that
decision casts no doubt on Shaffer's teaching about award execution; in
fact, contrary to initial appearances, Burnham strengthens the principle
announced in Shaffer's footnote 36. Burnham involved a due process
challenge to a California state court's jurisdiction over a New Jersey
husband whose wife sued for divorce in California. ,6 Service of process
against the husband was based on a brief business trip to California
followed by a short visit with his children.' 7 The Supreme Court held
that an "ancient form" of common law jurisdiction (the husband's
physical presence) met the Constitutional standard of fair play and
substantial justice, and did not fail for any defect under newer concepts
of personal jurisdiction.2"
While the Burnham Court's approach did not contrast Shaffer, the
approach was different. The plurality opinion by Justice Scalia
emphasized its rejection of the need to conduct "independent inquiry
into the desirability or fairness" of the prevailing rule on service of
process, leaving that matter to the state legislature.' 9 The plurality
opinion specifically questioned the more flexible standards suggested in a
concurrence by Justice Brennan, which had looked to "contemporary
notions of due process" to test the adequacy of jurisdiction.'3 ° Due
process should not, suggested Justice Scalia, depend on "individual
Justices' perceptions of fairness"'3 ' or the judiciary's "subjective
assessment of what is fair and just.' 3.
This latter point bears special emphasis: ad hoc justice based on
individualistic perceptions of fairness creates special risks for
international trade and investment. In connection with forum selection,
American judicial policy has long been guided by the recognition that
predictability is at a premium in cross-border business, where the wrong
forum can result in dramatically disagreeable surprises related to both
language and procedure. Although perhaps overstating its case, the
United States Supreme Court more than thirty years ago stated that
"[t]he elimination of all such uncertainties by agreeing in advance on a
forum acceptable to both parties is an indispensable element in
international trade ....
Even for observers not familiar with international trade and
125. 495 U.S. 604, 119-22 (I99O) (plurality opinion).
126. Id. at 6o7-08.
127. Id. at 608.
128. Id. at 619.
129. Id. at621.
130. Id. at 622-27.
131. Id. at 627.
132. Id. at 623.
133. MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. I, 13-14 (972).
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investment, the point should not be difficult to grasp. If a Boston seller
must sue a Georgia buyer in Atlanta, the dispute will take place within a
relatively homogeneous linguistic and procedural context. If the buyer is
located not in Atlanta, however, but in Athens, Algiers, or Aix-en-
Provence, the court action may proceed not in the language of
Shakespeare, but in the tongue of Demosthenes, Mohammed, or
Moliere. Even if the linguistic hurdle can be overcome, local counsel
must usually be engaged to advise on what to one side will be an
unfamiliar code of civil procedure. In some countries, the tradition of
judicial independence taken for granted in the United States may also be
less than self-evident.
The raison d'etre for the New York Convention, which the United
States is quick to stress when its own nationals face uncertainty abroad, is
to enhance predictability in dispute resolution. Confidence in the
reliability of cross-border arbitration clauses is put at risk whenever the
recognition of awards depends on malleable notions such as "minimum
contacts," "fair play" or "convenience."' 34
State courts have taken a similar approach in the context of foreign
country judgments. Lenchyshyn v. Pelko holds that a judgment creditor
"need not establish a basis for the exercise of personal jurisdiction" over
the debtor by New York courts.'35 This is particularly significant, given
that within the United States, other nations' judicial decisions benefit
from neither the "full faith and credit" accorded sister-state decisions,,6
134. For an example of the extent to which American courts can bend "minimum contacts"
principles when it seems convenient to do so, see Nowak v. Tak How, 94 F.3d 708, 713-16 (ISt Cir.
I996) (finding tort jurisdiction in a wrongful death action for drowning in a Hong Kong hotel).
135. 281 A.D.2d 42,47-48 (N.Y. App. Div. 2oos). In Lenchyshyn, an Ontario money judgment was
presented for enforcement in New York pursuant to Article 53 of the CPLR, New York's version of
the Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act. All parties in this matter were either
citizens or residents of Canada. The defendant debtors argued that New York was prohibited from
recognizing the Canadian judgment unless they had an "actual current presence" within New York or
there was some other basis for New York's exercise of personal jurisdiction. The court rejected the
assertion that any such requirement inhered in either the state judgments statute or the Due Process
Clause of the U.S. Constitution. The court explained its holding as a function of logic, fairness, and
practicality, emphasizing that the creditor sought no new substantive relief, but merely asked the court
to perform the "ministerial function of recognizing the foreign country money judgment and
converting it into a New York judgment." Id. at 49 (citing Breezevale Ltd. v. Dickinson, 693 N.Y.S.2d
532, 538 (App. Div. i999)); see also Pure Fishing, Inc. v. Silver Star Co., Ltd., 202 F. Supp. 2d 905,909-
1o (N.D. Iowa 2002) (quoting Lenchyshyn and finding its reasoning to be persuasive); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 481 cmt. h (1987) ("[An action to
enforce a [foreign] judgment may usually be brought wherever property of the defendant is found,
without any necessary connection between the underlying action and the property, or between the
defendant and the forum."). But see Electrolines, Inc. v. Prudential Assurance Co., Ltd., 677 N.W.2d
874,884-85 (Ct. App. Mich. 2003) (disagreeing with Lenchyshyn).
136. In general, U.S. courts will enforce a foreign judgment unless (i) the foreign court lacked
jurisdiction over the subject matter or person of the defendant; (ii) the judgment was fraudulently
obtained; or (iii) enforcement of the judgment would offend the public policy of the state in which
enforcement is sought. See, e.g., Ackerman v. Levine, 788 F.2d 830, 837 (2d Cir. 1986); Johnston v.
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nor from anything like the broad multilateral treaty obligation to
recognize given to awards under the New York Convention. '
B. ASSETS AND AWARD EXECUTION
i. Prelude: CME v. ZELEZNY
As noted above, much of the confusion over personal jurisdiction in
award enforcement derives from confusing two different standards of
fairness. The first applies to the contacts necessary before a court can
assert jurisdiction to decide the dispute on its merits. For example, a
court in the United States might be asked to decide whether a foreign
manufacturer sent defective goods to an American distributor, thereby
breaching the terms of their distribution agreement. For the court to pass
judgment on this claim, certain minimum contacts must exist between the
manufacturer and the state where the court sits.
By contrast, the situation is quite different if a judgment on the
matter has already been rendered by a tribunal overseas with clear
jurisdiction over the manufacturer. In such an instance, fairness no
longer requires the same level of contacts between the manufacturer and
the relevant forum in the United States.
The full contours of the contacts required in this second context
remain unclear, as will be discussed later. At the least, however, no
unfairness would result if the foreign manufacturer had property within
the forum. And indeed, this was the result reached in 2001 by a federal
court in the Southern District of New York in a dispute over a media
joint venture between a Czech respondent and a Dutch clmant.18
Although the court lacked the level of jurisdiction over the Czech
entrepreneur that would have permitted a decision on the merits, the
Compagnie G6n6rale Transatlantique, 152 N.E. 121, 122-23 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1926).
137. See New York Convention, supra note 14, art. I. The situation may soon change, however. On
June 30, 2005, the Conference on Private International Law agreed on the text of a treaty establishing
rules for recognition of court selection agreements. See Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements, 2oth Diplomatic Session, June 30 , 2005, 44 I.L.M. 1294. The Hague Convention provides
that a choice of court clause will be deemed exclusive and recognized as such. See id. ch. III, art. 8.
Courts other than the chosen forum must decline jurisdiction. See id. ch. II, art. 6. Enforcement is to be
granted to judgments of the chosen court, with suitable exceptions for consumer and employment
contracts, as well as special matters such as wills and personal injury claims. See id. ch. III, art. 9. For
background on this Convention initiative, see Louise Ellen Teitz, Both Sides of the Coin: A Decade of
Parallel Proceedings and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Transnational Litigation, so RoGER
WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 1, 40-47 (2004) and Ronald Brand, The New Hague Convention on Choice of
Court Agreements, ASIL INSIGHTS, July 26, 2005, http://www.asil.orglinsights/2oo5/o7/
insightso5o726.html. Cf European Communities Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 5968, 8 I.L.M. 229, which has now become
Council Regulation 44/2001, On Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in
Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 052) i (EC).
138. CME Media Enterprises B.V. v. Zelezny, No. oi CIV. 1733(DC), 2005 WL 1035138, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 1O, 2001).
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Czech's ownership of assets in New York (a bank account) proved
enough to permit a petition to enforce a foreign arbitral award.'39
Moreover, the presence of assets was enough, regardless of whether the
bank account was connected to the underlying dispute.'4" The court also
held that its jurisdiction was limited to the attached assets only (at the
time of the ruling the assets constituted only five cents), 4' the resulting
judgment could not be used elsewhere,'42 and the creditor was not
entitled to discovery concerning the existence of other assets.'43
2. The Fourth Circuit Decision in BASE METAL
Less than six months after the judgment in Zelezny, however, the
Fourth Circuit rejected the notion that jurisdiction to recognize an award
could be based on the existence of property. In Base Metal, a Guernsey
company was engaged in the business of buying and selling raw materials
used to make aluminum." Arbitration in Russia of a dispute with an
aluminum manufacturer led to a $12 million award in favor of the
Guernsey claimant, which it tried to enforce against an aluminum
shipment of the debtor that was arriving in Baltimore.'45
Award confirmation was dismissed for lack of personal
jurisdiction. I, 6 The lower court noted that the Russian respondent's only
contact with the district was the single aluminum shipment that had been
seized, which was unconnected with the dispute leading to the
139. Id. at *3-4.
x4o. Such jurisdiction is sometimes referred to as quasi in rem jurisdiction, although the term
seems to have come into disfavor, rightly or wrongly, during the past few years.
141. At the time this action was commenced, Zelezny's account at Citibank in New York
amounted to $69.65. Id. at *4 The balance was reduced to five cents after deduction of charges. Id. The
decision was never appealed. An urban legend holds that counsel did exchange five cents at the close
of the proceedings.
142. Commentators have questioned why the court believed that the effect of its ruling should be
limited to the value of the assets in the district that had been attached. The attached account was
unrelated to the subject matter of the award and the parties fully litigated the question of whether any
of the New York Convention defenses applied. For a comment on this aspect of the case, see C.R.
Ragan, United States: Recent US Cases on Enforcement of Awards - US Courts Become Enforcement
Courts to the World, Or Do They?, 6 INT'L A.L.R. 1 (20o3) and Strong, supra note 28, at 487 n.42.
Commentators have also questioned the notion that a different court in New York or elsewhere in the
United States would not treat the Zelezny decision as res judicata as to the enforceability of the award
against Mr. Zelezny. See, e.g., Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284
F.3d 1t14, 1122, 1122 n.5 (9th Cir. 2002). One might ask also why the creditor, having an enforceable
award, was denied a right to seek discovery as to the existence of other assets within the jurisdiction.
See, e.g., New York City Bar Report, supra note 29, at 3 ("[A party] seeking enforcement based upon
the presence of the defendant's property within the state, should, in any event, be entitled to
jurisdictional discovery based on the same showing required of plaintiffs in other types of actions.").
143. Zelezny, 2001 WL 1035138, at *3.
144. Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminium Factory," 283 F.3d 208, 211
(4th Cir. 2002).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 216.
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arbitration.'47 The Fourth Circuit affirmed.
The court of appeals stated that New York Convention awards can
be enforced only against parties with "minimum contacts" to the forum
such that the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice."'' 8 Citing Shaffer v. Heitner for the proposition that
the same due process requirement applies regardless of whether property
is located in the district,'49 the court affirmed dismissal of the petition to
confirm because "the mere presence of seized property in Maryland
provides no basis for asserting jurisdiction when there is no relationship
between the property and the action."'50
This conclusion is hard to square with either logic or policy, and is at
odds with the Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law, which
provides that "an action to enforce a foreign arbitral award requires
jurisdiction over the award debtor or his property."'5' Similarly, the
American Law Institute Proposed Federal Statute on Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments takes the position that an action to
recognize or enforce a foreign judgment may be brought either where
the judgment debtor is subject to personal jurisdiction, or where its assets
are located.'52 Finally, the position in Base Metal remains at odds with the
principle established in Shaffer, that the presence of assets provides an
adequate basis for enforcement of a sister-state judgment, regardless of
whether the property bears any connection with the underlying claim.'53
Unfortunately, since Base Metal no case has been decided in which
the same basic fact pattern was presented.'54 In dicta in Glencore Grain,
147. Id. at 212. The federal district court asserted that "[b]y no stretch could the single shipment,
or even several such shipments, constitute continuous and systematic contacts with Maryland so as to
justify general jurisdiction over NKAZ [the respondent]." Id. at 211.
148. Id. at 213 (internal quotations omitted). The court had begun by noting that the New York
Convention confers subject matter jurisdiction on federal courts, but does not grant personal
jurisdiction when it would not otherwise exist. Id. at 212. Determining whether personal jurisdiction
exists is normally a two-step process, looking first to the requirement of the long-arm statute of the
state where the federal court sits, and second determining whether the exercise of jurisdiction
comports with the due process requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 213. Since
Maryland's long-arm statute expands the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the full limits allowed by
the Due Process Clause, the two-step analysis merges into a single inquiry of whether the exercise of
personal jurisdiction would be consistent with due process.
149. Id. ("[Wlhen the property which serves as the basis for jurisdiction is completely unrelated to
the plaintiff's cause of action, the presence of property alone will not support jurisdiction.").
150. Id. at 211.
151. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 487 cmt. c
(1987) (emphasis added).
152. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN JUDGMENTS: ANALYSIS AND PROPOSED FEDERAL
STATUTE § 9(b)(i) & (ii) (Proposed Official Draft 2005).
153. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
154. The same parties were also involved in litigation in the Third Circuit. Base Metal Trading,
Ltd, v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminium Factory," 47 F. App'x 73 (3 d Cir. 2002). In that case,
however, Base Metal failed to raise the quasi in rem argument until it reached the appellate court
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the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the principle announced in Base Metal,
but decided the case under a different rationale.'55 The Second Circuit, in
Dardana Ltd. v. A.O. Yeganskneftgaz, 56 examined the question of
whether jurisdiction over the award debtor's assets was sufficient to
enforce a foreign award. However, the court remanded the matter to the
district court, and the case settled before a decision was rendered.
3. A Further Look at Reasonableness
In addition to its conclusion that the presence of respondent's assets
in the district was insufficient to permit award confirmation, the Fourth
Circuit went on to state that the petition must be dismissed because it
was unreasonable to assume jurisdiction even if quasi in rem jurisdiction
had been sufficient as a general matter. The court of appeals suggested
that it was unclear "why the limited resources of the federal courts
should be spent resolving disputes between two foreign corporations
with little or no connection to our country," and that "the burdens of
subjecting a foreign company to suit in this country in this case are not
justified."'57
Most observers can sympathize with the Fourth Circuit's concern
about the workload of the federal judiciary. And lawsuits involving
foreigners with no connection to the United States might seem like a
good place to begin the pruning process.
However, when an award debtor has assets and business in the
United States, it is difficult to take seriously the concerns expressed
about distance to the forum. If keeping property and doing business in
the United States is not too much of a burden for the award debtor, why
should the court be solicitous of the burden of defending the
enforcement action?
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit's approach gives insufficient weight to
the fact that such refusal to recognize a New York Convention award
places the United States in breach of an international treaty.'58 As
mentioned earlier, the Convention permits non-recognition of an award
for a limited number of defenses. Thus, any "reasonableness analysis"
must take into account the public interest in having the United States
level. Id. at 78. As a result, the Third Circuit, which held that Base Metal lacked the minimum contacts
with New Jersey, refused to address the question of quasi in rem jurisdiction. Id. at 77.
155. See Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 1114, 1122 (9th
Cir. 2002).
156. 317 F.3d 202, 207-08 (2d Cir. 2003); see also Ndeagro B.V. v. ZAO Konversbank, No. 02 Civ.
39 46(HB), 2003 WL 151997, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2003) (refusing to decide whether quasi in rem
jurisdiction sufficed in an action to enforce a New York Convention award where an annulment
proceeding was pending at the arbitral situs).
157. Base Metal Trading, Ltd. v. OJSC "Novokuznetsky Aluminium Factory," 283 F.3 d 208, 215-
16 (4th Cir. 2002) (citing Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987)).
i58. See ILC Report, supra note io, at i.
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meet its international obligation.
Indeed, failure to comply with treaty obligations could, in some
circumstances, create liability under one of the many bilateral investment
treaties to which the United States is party.'59 Giving proper weight to
these treaty obligations would have gone a long way toward establishing
the reasonableness of allowing a motion to confirm the award in Base
Metal, regardless of concerns about docket crowding. Although the
concern about the Russian respondent's burden of defending an
enforcement action thousands of miles from home is not entirely
unpersuasive, this hypothetical inconvenience must be weighed against
the prospect of placing the United States in breach of its international
treaty obligation.
There should be no mystery about the policy behind, and vital
significance of, this treaty obligation of award recognition. In a world
lacking any neutral supranational courts of mandatory jurisdiction to
decide cases or enforce foreign judgments, arbitration bolsters cross-
border economic cooperation by enhancing confidence within the
business community that commercial commitments will be respected.
When a respondent had been found liable for breach of contract by
a tribunal to whose jurisdiction it had freely consented, and has availed
itself of the American markets by opening a bank account or shipping
goods for sale into the United States, there is nothing about a petition to
enforce the award that offends notions of "fair play and substantial
justice."'' 6" In today's world of multinational law firms, fax, email, and the
Internet, it would be almost surreal to agonize about the fairness of
recognizing a respondent's commercial obligations in a jurisdiction to
which it ships goods or owns property.
C. WHEN ASSETS ARE ABSENT
The most difficult scenario for recognition of a Convention award
arises when the party which lost the foreign arbitration has no assets at
all in the district where enforcement is sought. In such circumstances, it is
not hard to understand why a reasonable person might perceive a lack of
personal jurisdiction based on insufficient contacts with the forum.
Appearances can be deceiving, however.
As an initial matter, one must recall the earlier observation that in
159. An investor denied an opportunity to enforce an otherwise valid award might argue that such
a decision constituted a denial of justice under the applicable bilateral investment treaty. Among the
provisions commonly found in bilateral investment treaties is a requirement that the host state accord
foreign investments fair and equitable treatment. This provision has been construed to include claims
based on a denial of justice. See JAN PAULSSON, DENIAL OF JUSTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 127-30
(2005).
i6o. Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S.
457,463 (1940)).
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many situations the winner in an arbitration has sound practical reasons
to seek award confirmation. A respondent that has been exonerated
from liability will wish to guard against competing litigation by clothing
the award with the res judicata imprimatur of an American court. And a
winning claimant will wish to be ready to enforce the award in the event
the foreign award debtor later brings assets into the United States. Given
that the FAA provides only three years for award confirmation, a delay
beyond that point could result in a "so sad, too bad" result, with the
victor in the arbitral proceedings being out of luck due to delay.
As discussed earlier, footnote 36 of Shaffer v. Heitner indicates that
the Constitution calls for a significantly lower threshold of contacts to
justify "notions of fair play" when a court is asked to hear a matter after
a judgment on the merits has been rendered in a forum that had
jurisdiction over the losing party. Nevertheless, one must still ask
whether it is otherwise "fair" to require a foreign party to defend against
award confirmation in a district where its property is absent. 6 '
This was the question posed when the Ninth Circuit heard
arguments in Glencore Grain.' A Dutch corporation had sought
recognition of a New York Convention award made in England against
an Indian rice exporter. Although there was evidence that the Indian
company occasionally did business with California parties, and even
retained a sales agent there, it had no assets in California at the time the
confirmation petition was filed.
In upholding the district court's dismissal of the motion, the Ninth
Circuit indicated in dicta that the result might have been different if the
award debtor had assets in the forum state, regardless of whether its
property was related to the underlying cause of action. Thus, the Ninth
Circuit avoided the analytic mistake made in Base Metal.
Nevertheless, the court of appeals decisively rejected any argument
that it had jurisdiction to hear the confirmation petition in the absence of
attachable assets in the forum state. This approach seems to miss the
mark. In the context of a New York Convention award, no unfairness
results (at least on a constitutional level) from requiring the loser in a
foreign proceeding to defend against a confirmation petition regardless
of whether it has assets in the forum state.
Sound practical reasons led the drafters of the New York
Convention to use the term "recognition" as well as "enforcement."'6
When the winner in a foreign arbitration obtains a court order
161. See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 28, at 3. Professor Weintraub notes this to be a legitimate
question, but concludes that there is nothing inherently unfair in making a foreign party defend against
award confirmation in a forum where assets are absent.
162. Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3d 114 (9th Cir. 2002).
163. New York Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(i).
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recognizing the award, the legal and factual findings of the award
become incorporated into a juridical act of the forum state. The
recognition in itself, however, does not direct one side to pay money to
the other. This is of considerable significance since the fairness of any
exercise of judicial jurisdiction depends to some extent on context.
The stakes involved in having an award "recognized" are often less
than those for "enforcement," since in the former case no assets are
seized. This lesser exercise of judicial power means a lesser threshold
nexus between forum and person in order to satisfy due process.'
64
III. TOWARD A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION
A. CONSENT TO JURISDICTION CLAUSES
Perhaps the most pragmatic response to cases such as Base Metal
and Glencore Grain will prove to be the addition of consent to
jurisdiction clauses in international arbitration agreements.'6" As the
market reacts to the fact that the United States is not as arbitration-
friendly as once anticipated, an evolution in arbitration clauses can be
expected toward inclusion of language making clear that the parties, at
least ex ante, wish to eliminate the surprise obstacles resulting from
uncertain fact patterns. These might one day become as commonplace as
"consent to judgment" clauses in domestic arbitration agreements. 66
At the extreme end of the spectrum one might see clauses explicitly
providing for awards to be recognized in any court of all contracting
states to the New York Convention. These clauses would expressly waive
any objection to the competence of such courts, including without
limitation defenses based on lack of personal jurisdiction or the absence
of property in the recognition forum. The drafters might go on to provide
that neither side will, on the basis of forum non conveniens or similar
notions, seek dismissal of a motion for award confirmation. Simpler
clauses might state that both parties consent to the personal jurisdiction
of any court where award recognition may be sought.' 6' Only time will
tell how this branch of transactional law will evolve.
164. Id.
165. For cases evidencing a longstanding benevolent attitude toward judicial jurisdiction clauses,
see M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. t, I6 (r972) and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U.S. 585,596 (i995).
166. See 9 U.S.C. § 9 (2OO6). The provisions of FAA § 203 (9 U.S.C. § 203) make such stipulations
unnecessary for most international contracts.
167. See New York City Bar Report, supra note 29, at 4 ("[Arbitration clauses] provide that the
parties consent to recognition and enforcement of any resulting award in any jurisdiction and waive
any defense to recognition or enforcement based upon lack of jurisdiction over their person or
property or based upon forum non conveniens."); Arkin, supra note 28, at 46 (proposing a similar
solution).
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B. IMPLIED WAIVER: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ARBITRAL SEAT
If the Constitution established its mandates for personal jurisdiction
with bright lines, courts might be justified in perceiving themselves as
limited in recognizing the commercial realities that call for a liberal
policy toward enforcement of foreign awards. Little doubt exists,
however, that notions such as "minimum contacts" and "fairness" remain
chameleon-like and malleable, subject to individual perceptions of
fairness.' 6 Consequently, there seems little reason for the interpreters of
Constitutional requirements to remain blind to the way practical
elements of cross-border transactions shape an understanding of proper
policy.
In an international business, as in any commercial venture, the
contract negotiations provide a useful starting point for understanding
the parties' intentions and expectations. During negotiation of
international commercial arbitration agreements, the choice of the
arbitral venue generally looms paramount. In some measure, the concept
of arbitral situs is being transformed into the notion of "seat of
arbitration,' 69 an expression which increasingly serves to designate the
country to which the parties have pegged their international arbitration,
notwithstanding that the hearings and deliberations take place
elsewhere.'70
The place of arbitration bears directly on award enforceability for
reasons other than political and geographic. For example, an award
vacated at the place of arbitration loses its international currency under
the New York Convention.'' Thus, one would usually seek an arbitral
168. See Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604,623 (99o); text accompanying notes 125-33.
169. See English Arbitration Act, 1996, C. 23, §§ 2-3 (fixing the statutory scope by reference to
arbitration with a seat in England, Wales, or Northern Ireland, and providing for designation of the
seat by the parties, the arbitral institution or the arbitral tribunal). Thus, the arbitration seat is less a
matter of real geography than a link to the legal order of the place whose curial law will govern many
aspects of the proceedings. See ALAN REDFERN ET AL., LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 83-88 (4th ed. 2004); Francis A. Mann, Where Is An Award "Made"?, I
ARa. INT'L 107 (1985).
170. For a Swedish case rejecting the effect of an arbitral seat deemed a fiction, see Titan v.
Alcatel CIT, Svea Hovratt [Court of Appeal] 2005-03-29 (Swed.), reproduced at 20 INT'L ARB. REP A-
I (July 2005). For insightful commentary on the case, see Sigvard Jarvin & Carroll S. Dorgan, Are
Foreign Parties Still Welcome in Stockholm?-The Svea Court's Decision in Titan Corporation v.
Alcatel CIT S.A. Raises Doubts, 20 INT'L ARB. REP. 42 (July 2005). The court held it had no
jurisdiction to hear a challenge to an award, notwithstanding that the place of arbitration chosen by
the parties' arbitration clause was Stockholm. With the parties' consent, the sole arbitrator had
conducted hearings in Paris and London. The Court decided that a "Swedish judicial interest" must
exist as a prerequisite for judicial review. Id.
171. New York Convention, supra note 14, art. V(s)(e). The English version of Article V(1)(e)
reads: "Recognition and enforcement of the award may be refused... [if the award] has been set aside
or suspended by a competent authority of the country in which, or under the law of which, that award
was made." The equally authoritative French text, "lends itself to a more forceful interpretation,"
providing that "recognition and enforcement will not be refused unless the award ... was annulled
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
situs in a country whose arbitration law prohibits judicial meddling with
the merits of the case.
More importantly, however, many countries (including the United
States) apply the Convention on the basis of geographical reciprocity,
recognizing only awards made in the territory of another contracting
State. 172 Consequently, informed parties will insist on arbitrating in a
country that has ratified or acceded to the Convention,'73 and will reject
arbitration in nations that are not parties to the Convention.'74
From a Rawlsian perspective,'75 award recognition in all Convention
countries certainly meets the parties' criteria of fairness. Behind the veil
of ignorance at the time of contract signature, each side to the potential
arbitration expects that a decision in its favor would receive res judicata
status. To maximize this prospect, together the two parties selected an
arbitral venue in a state where the Convention was in force, not knowing
the extent to which (if at all) assets would be present in the territory
where confirmation might be sought. Therefore, by recognizing a
Convention award, regardless of the presence of property, a court gives
effect to the parties' bargain status quo ex ante.
Waiver presents another approach to the same point.I 6 Like many
other legal rights, the invocation of personal jurisdiction as a litigation
defense may be relinquished through informed consent.'77
where rendered (La reconnaissance et l'execution de la sentence ne seront refusges que si la sentence...
a 6t annule ou suspendue)." William W. Park, Duty and Discretion in International Arbitration, 93
AM. J. INT'L LAW 805, 81o-ii n.45 (I999). The other three official versions, Chinese, Russian, and
Spanish, seem to comport with the permissive English. Id. at 811. See generally Richard W. Hulbert,
Further Observations on Chromalloy: A Contract Misconstrued, a Law Misapplied, and an Opportunity
Foregone, 13 ICSID REV. 124, 144 (1998); Jan Paulsson, May or Must Under the New York
Convention: An Exercise in Syntax and Linguistics, 14 ARB. INT'L 227, 229 (1998).
172. Such reservations are explicitly permitted by New York Convention, supra note 14, art. 1(3).
173. As of October 2005, 136 states were parties to the Convention.
174. See, e.g., Nigel Blackaby, Arbitration and Brazil: A Foreign Perspective, 17 ARB. INT'L 129,
129-31 (2001) (discussing problems faced by Brazil in getting international parties to agree to arbitrate
there prior to its recent ratification of the New York Convention).
175. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
176. The notion that an agreement to arbitrate in a signatory country can constitute a basis for
finding waiver of the personal jurisdiction requirement was rejected by the District of Columbia
Circuit in Creighton Ltd. v. Gov't of the State of Qatar, 181 F.3d 118, 125-26 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
However, that case involved a foreign state. Id. at 12o. The court proceeded on the assumption that a
foreign state is a "person" under the Constitution. Id. at 124-25. That assumption has been
subsequently rejected. See, e.g., Price v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 294 F.3d 82, 96
(D.C. Cir. 2002). In any event, to the extent that Creighton remains good law in the District of
Columbia, its conclusions must be questioned for the reasons set forth infra.
177. The United States Supreme Court has squarely held that personal jurisdiction is a right that is
waivable by implied conduct or that a party may be estopped from raising based on prior conduct. For
example, in Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, the Court noted that "because the personal jurisdiction
requirement is a waivable right, there are a variety of legal arrangements by which a litigant may give
express or implied consent to the personal jurisdiction of the court." 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985)
(quoting Ins. Corp. of It. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 703 (1982)). The court
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When business managers agree to arbitrate in a Convention country,
local procedural defenses in the enforcement forum are precisely the
type of obstacles to contract implementation that they seek to avoid. The
whole purpose of the Convention was to give awards an international
currency that would make them transportable from one country to
another without reliance on the idiosyncrasies of the place where
recognition might be sought. A seat in a New York Convention nation is
chosen to enhance the parties' chance of award recognition, foreclosing
the loser's option to expand or create defenses not available under New
York Convention Article V.'
78
Alternately, the loser in the arbitration might be considered
estopped from objecting to the authority of a court to recognize the
Convention award.'79 If one side has bargained for a treaty framework
that limits the grounds on which its commercial counterparty can escape
the award's binding effect, fairness requires symmetrical limits on the
right to say that the recognition forum lacked authority to confirm the
award, or that the recognition has provided inconvenience.
The court in Glencore Grain assumed that any dismissal of
recognition now would not foreclose enforcement in the future when the
respondent brings property into the forum.1"' As mentioned earlier, this
would not normally be so, given the limited time available for
confirmation under the FAA.'"' Moreover, when the respondent is an
exporter (as in Glencore Grain), property is often in the precarious form
of account receivables,"" which in today's world can be transferred
electronically to another country before application for enforcement
under whatever local procedures may be available.' 83 Consequently,
important benefits attach to the ability to obtain award confirmation
regardless of the existence of assets within the recognition forum.'
84
therefore concluded that enforcement of forum-selection provisions does not offend due process when
they have been freely negotiated and are neither unreasonable nor unjust. See 471 U.S. at 472 n.14
(quoting MIS Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. i, 15 (972)).
178. On implied consent in another context, see John M. Fedders, et al. Waiver by Conduct - A
Possible Response to the Internationalization of the Securities Markets, 6 J. COMP. Bus. & CAPITAL
MARKET L. s, 16 (I984) (applying a similar theory to neutralize foreign bank secrecy legislation used to
block enforcement of U.S. securities laws by foreign participants in American markets).
179. See Ins. Corp. of Ir., 456 U.S. at 704 (citing Victory Transport Inc. v. Comisaria General de
Abastecimientos y Transportes, 336 F.2d 354, 363 (2d Cir. 1964)) (noting that lower federal courts
have found consent to personal jurisdiction implicit in agreements to arbitrate).
18o. Glencore Grain Rotterdam v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain, 284 F.3d 114, 1128 n.9 (9th Cir.
2002).
18s. 9 U.S.C. § 207 (2oo6).
582. The point was made forcefully in Weintraub, supra note 28, at 2.
583. On the absence of district court power to enjoin dissipation of assets prior to entry of money
judgment, see Grupo Mexicano de Desarollo, S.A v. Alliance Bond Fund Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 323-24
(1999).
184. Interestingly, one means of capturing funds of non-domiciliaries (either for enforcement or
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Broader policy concerns play an important role with respect to
matters such as the limits of fairness and "minimum contacts," which by
their nature lack bright lines and clear definition. In this connection, the
logic of a long line of United States Supreme Court rulings argues for
award enforcement, notwithstanding the absence of present assets in the
state where the district court sits. The Court has emphasized that
confidence in the binding nature of international arbitration and in court
selection enhances cross-border trade, finance, and investment.'
85
The corollary to these principles is that economic cooperation
suffers when its legal framework permits recalcitrant parties to hide
assets.' 86 Without reliable recognition of arbitration awards, many
business transactions either would remain unconsummated or would be
concluded at higher costs to reflect the absence of adequate mechanisms
to vindicate contract rights.
Intriguingly, from the perspective of the international practitioner,
the Second Circuit in Monegasque asserted that broader award
recognition would undermine arbitration.' Its argument seemed to run
that the prospect of greater venues where an award could be confirmed
might chill trade, since that possibility would make some litigants more
wary of concluding international contracts.'
The point has some force, of course. It is certainly true that parties
ambivalent about an international commercial relationship will think
twice (as well they should) before concluding an agreement that provides
for jurisdictional purposes) includes attachment of payments made through electronic fund transfers.
Correspondent accounts are held in the United States by the banks of non-domiciliaries for the
purpose of effecting payments in U.S. dollars from one out-of-state account to another. However, this
is not permitted under the Uniform Commercial Code as applicable in most states. See, e.g., New York
UCC art. 4-A-Io4(3)(2001). But the same attachment actions are permitted if the underlying
arbitration includes a maritime claim. See Winter Storm Shipping, Ltd. v. TPI, 198 F. Supp. 2d 385, 392
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), vacated 31o F.3d 263 (2d Cir. 2002).
185. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 629 (1985);
Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 516-17 (974); M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1, 13 (1972).
186. See, e.g., Michael Bobelian, A Win in Name Only: Enforcing Judgments Against Foreign
Entities Is A Long-Term Endeavor, N.Y.L.J., Mar. 31, 2005, col. 2 (describing multi-year efforts of
award creditors to enforce arbitral awards against recalcitrant states).
187. Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 496-97 (2d Cir.
2002).
i88. The court stated:
Forcing the recognition and enforcement in Mexico, for example, in a case of an arbitral
award made in Indonesia, where the parties, the underlying events and the award have no
connection to Mexico, may be highly inconvenient overall and might chill international
trade if the parties had no recourse but to litigate, at any cost, enforcement of arbitral
awards in a petitioner's chosen forum. The Convention was intended to promote the
enforcement of international arbitration so that businesses would not be wary of entering
into international contracts. It would be counterproductive if such an application of the
Convention gave businesses a new cause for concern.
Id. (citing Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukr., i58 F. Supp. 2d 377, 383
(S.D.N.Y. 2001)).
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multiple jurisdictions around the world in which an adjudication of rights
can be given effect. What this approach misses is the concomitant benefit
of discouraging economic risk-taking by players unwilling to take
responsibility for their breaches of contract. To some extent, this is what
the rule of law is all about in an international business context.
Moreover, it would be surprising indeed if award creditors expended
funds bringing random confirmation motions in places unconnected with
the debtors' commercial activity, and where attachable assets were not
likely to exist in the near future. In Glencore Grain, for example, the
Indian respondent had elected to do business in California on several
occasions and maintained a relationship with a California sales agent.'
8
In such circumstances it is hard to see the unfairness of requiring the
respondent to live with the consequences of its profit-seeking behavior,
by defending itself in a proceeding to enforce an award rendered by a
tribunal to whose jurisdiction it had consented. Indeed, the
reasonableness of this approach seems to have been accepted in more
than one country that has been an active participant in international
arbitration, including England," France, 9' and Belgium."'
IV. THE ROLE FOR FORUM NON CONVENIENS
A. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN RESPECT FOR TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Unlike limits on personal jurisdiction, the doctrine of forum non
conveniens does not rest on Constitutional underpinnings,'" but derives
189. See Glencore Grain Rotterdam B.V. v. Shivnath Rai Harnarain Co., 284 F.3 d 1114, 11I9 (9th
Cir. 2002).
19o. See V.V. VEEDER, INTERNATIONAL HANDBOOK ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION ch. VII, 2 (Supp.
Mar. 23, 1997) ("Where the defendant is overseas, the applicant [of a motion to enforce the award]
must seek the court's leave on affidavit to effect service of the enforcement proceedings outside the
jurisdiction; but the court's exercise of jurisdiction is not conditional on the defendant having assets
within England."). Such an affidavit must set forth the belief that a good cause of action exists and
must indicate the country where the defendant can likely be found; see also ABCI v. BFT, [1996] 1
Lloyd's Rep. 485; FESC v. Sovcomflot, [I995] s Lloyd's Rep. 520, (1996) 21 ICCA YEARBOOK COMM.
ARB. 699; Rosseel NV v. Oriental, [1991] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 625, 629, (1991) 16 ICCA YEARBOOK COMM.
AlB. 615.
191. A party resisting enforcement of a New York Convention award before a French court may
not raise claims based on lack of territorial jurisdiction. See, e.g., GL Outillage v. Stankoimport, Cour
d'appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, July io, 1992, reprinted at 1994 REV. ARB. 142, 7 INT'L
ARB. REP. Bi, B2 (Sept. 1992) (holding inadmissible as grounds of appeal the lack of territorial
jurisdiction of the court hearing the enforcement application); see also PHILIPPE FOUCHARD, FOUCHARD,
GAILLARD, & GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 887-962 (Emmanuel Gaillard &
John Savage eds., 1999) (citing GL Outillage with approval).
192. See Hans van Houtte & Erik Valgaeren, The Enforcement Procedure of Foreign Arbitral
Awards in Belgium, 14 ARB. INT'L 431, 433 (1998) (stating that when the person against whom the
award is to be enforced "has no domicile or residence in Belgium, the President of the arrondissement
where the enforcement will take place has territorial jurisdiction" (quoting CJ art. 1719(2))).
193. See generally Edward L. Barrett, Jr., The Doctrine of Forum Non Conveniens, 35 CAL. L. REV.
380, 386-89 (1947).
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instead from a court's inherent power to manage its own docket.'94 Once
described as "a supervening venue provision" that comes into play when
a trial court declines jurisdiction,'95 forum non conveniens implicates a
multistage analysis. No level of the analysis implicates bright lines.'
96
Determining whether to honor the plaintiff's choice of forum requires
first a finding on whether an adequate alternative forum exists. If so,
courts may proceed to balance what have been called "the private and
public interests" that bear on where the case should be adjudicated.'97
Consequently, courts do not dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds
either if no adequate alternative forum exists, or if a balancing of
interests indicates that dismissal would not be appropriate.'
Under a proper application of these principles, the instances will be
few and far between when the doctrine of forum non conveniens justifies
dismissal of a motion to confirm a New York Convention award. The
breach of a treaty obligation is no light matter. The United States has a
vital public interest in following through with its international
commitments, which will normally outweigh the other interest factors
(public and private) militating in favor of dismissal.'
B. DETERMINING THE PROPER PARTY
While forum non conveniens rarely justifies refusal to recognize an
award covered by the New York Convention, such instances do exist. An
exception to the general rule might be found in the very facts that gave
rise to Monegasque." The Second Circuit upheld dismissal of an action
194. See Monegasque de Reassurances S.A.M. v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488, 498-5o
(2d Cir. 2002).
195. See also Am. Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994); Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,
454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981). For a recent discussion of the doctrine as a means to defend against lawsuits
in federal courts, see David W. Rivkin & Suzanne M. Grosso, Forum Non Conveniens: A Doctrine on
the Move, 5 Bus. LAW INT'L I (2004).
196. See Gross v. British Broad. Corp., 386 F.3d 224, 230 (2d Cir. 2004).
197. Piper Aircraft Co., 454 U.S. at 246 (emphasis added).
198. In Iragorri v. United Tech. Corp., the Second Circuit considered en banc the degree of
deference that should be afforded to a plaintiff's choice of forum, when that forum is different from
the one in which the plaintiff resides. 274 F.3d 65, 71 (2d Cir. 2OO). The court of appeals instructed the
district courts to apply a "sliding scale" of deference to that choice, explaining that U.S. courts "give
deference to a plaintiff's choice of her home forum because it is presumed to be convenient," a
presumption that is much less reasonable when the plaintiff is foreign. Id. at 71 (citations omitted).
Consequently, the greater the plaintiff's or the lawsuit's bona fide connection to the United States and
to the forum of choice, and the more that considerations of convenience favor conduct of the lawsuit
in the United States, the more difficult will be dismissal for forum non conveniens. Id.
199. For example, under this analysis, the Ninth Circuit's decision in Melton v. Oy Nautor Ab
should not stand given that the respondent in that case had assets in the district and it was
unreasonable to compel the petitioner to travel to Finland to get paid. No. 97-15395, 1998 WL 613798,
at **2-3 (9th Cir. Sept. 4, 1998).
200. 311 F.3d 488, 498-501 (2d Cir. 2002). For an earlier case dismissing award recognition on
forum non conveniens grounds, see Melton, where the Ninth Circuit upheld the district court's
dismissal of an action brought by a purchaser of a yacht who had obtained an award in Finland against
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brought by a foreign reinsurer that had been subrogated to rights against
a Ukrainian entity called "Naftogaz," which was arguably an
instrumentality of the Government of the Ukraine. On the face of the
arbitration agreement, the state was not a party to the arbitration
agreement.
The question of "who is the proper party" is not uncommon to
international or domestic arbitration, and arises frequently in connection
with actions against so-called "non-signatories .... Courts must often
determine whether arbitration is appropriate with respect to a person
that did not agree to arbitrate. Parent-subsidiary relationships provide
fertile ground for disagreements,2"2 leading courts occasionally to extend
the burdens and benefits of an arbitration clause. In such instances,
courts must be rigorous in their investigation of the parties' real
intentions on the existence or scope of arbitral authority,"3 resisting the
temptation to apply vague verbal formulae independent of the
commercial context.'
a Finnish corporation with a sales agent in California. 1998 1998 WL 613798, at **1-4. The court did
not find a lack of jurisdiction over the respondent, presumably because the presence of the sales agent
precluded such an argument. Id. Instead, the court felt that the Finnish courts were better situated to
determine whether the award rendered against Oy Nautor Ab was enforceable or not. Id. In another
case, Nedagro B.V. v. Zao Konversbank, No. 02 Crv. 39 4 6(HB), 2003 WL 151997, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y.
Jan. 21, 2003), the district court heard argument on the forum non conveniens issue but elected not to
address the issue because of its decision to stay proceedings pending the resolution of an annulment
action in Russia.
201. The term "nonsignatory" has long served as a useful shorthand reference to persons whose
right or obligation to arbitrate may be problematic, even though the FAA provides for enforcement of
an unsigned written provision to arbitrate, such as an exchange of telegrams, emails or sales forms.
Lack of signature does not in itself, however, taint an arbitration clause under the FAA. When
enforcement under the New York Convention is in question, the issue becomes more complex. Some
agreements to arbitration must be signed, while others need not be. The nub of discord centers on
punctuation, with the focus of attention on the comma preceding the phrase "signed by parties" in
Convention Article II. Some courts interpret the signature requirement to apply only to the words "an
arbitration agreement" found just before the comma. Others apply the signature requirement to
everything in the early part of the sentence, including reference to arbitral clauses in contracts. The
answer may be significant where the Convention provides the only basis for federal courts to exercise
jurisdiction. See Kahn Lucas Lancaster v. Lark Int'l Ltd., 186 F.3d 210, 218 (2d Cir. 1999) (finding that
"signed by the parties" applied to arbitral clauses encapsulated in broader contracts as well as separate
arbitration agreements).
202. See Ceska Sporitelna, a.s. v. Unisys Corp., No. 96-4152, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15435, at *I2
(E.D. Pa. Oct. io, 1996) at *12 (remarking that the general rule is "that only signatories to a contract
can be bound by an arbitration clause found within the contract"); Thomson-CSF v. Am. Arbitration
Ass'n, 64 F.3d 773, 776 (2d Cir. 1995) (recognizing five exceptions to the general rule that arbitration
agreements do not bind non-signatories: incorporation by reference, assumption, agency, piercing of
corporate veil and estoppel).
203. See Sphere Drake Ins. v. All Am. Ins., 256 F.3 d 587, 589-91 (7th Cir. 2001).
204. For a problematic case in this connection, see, e.g., Contec Corp. v. Remote Solution Co. Ltd.,
398 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2005) (finding that it was for arbitrators, not courts, to decide whether a
corporation that had not signed an arbitration clause could compel arbitration). The result in the case
may be unobjectionable, since the non-signatory was the surviving entity from a merger involving a
contracting party. However, it might have been more prudent for the court to order arbitration on its
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In Monegasque, the question that arose was whether a nation, the
Ukraine, could be made liable on an award by reason of piercing the
corporate veil between the government and a state-owned corporation."
The district court felt this was an issue better decided by the Ukrainian
courts than those in New York and dismissed the request to confirm the
award."°
The Second Circuit agreed."° Dismissal of the confirmation motion
was held justifiable not only because the Ukrainian courts were deemed
to provide an adequate forum for resolution of the corporate veil
question, but also because the Ukraine had a more significant interest
than the United States in the award enforcement action.20
The Second Circuit has not always shown such shyness in
determining whether one entity should be liable for the debts of another.
Indeed, the court took a quite different approach three years later in
Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corp.,209 deciding that a parent corporation,
Oracle Corporation, would not answer for the obligations of its
subsidiary, Oracle Systems, pursuant to an arbitration clause signed only
by the latter."' In Sarhank, a contract performed in Egypt had been
interpreted under Egyptian law by an arbitral tribunal sitting in Cairo,
finding that the parent was bound by the signature of its wholly-owned
subsidiary."' Citing what it called "the customary expectations of
experienced business persons," the court vacated a lower-court decision
that had recognized the Egyptian award." '
A year earlier, in Compagnie Noga d'Importation et d'Exportation
own finding of jurisdiction under the relevant facts. Cf JSC Surgutneftegaz v. Harvard College, 2005
WL 1863676 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (involving investors' class action arbitration over dividend policy of a
Russian company whose shares were evidenced by American Depository Receipts held in New York).
Here the contest was not about who had agreed to arbitrate, but rather the scope of an arbitration
clause that had clearly been signed by both sides.
205. Monegasque de Reassurances v. NAK Naftogaz of Ukr., 311 F.3d 488,492 (2d Cir. 2002).
206. Id. at 493.
207. Id. at 5oo-o.
2o8. Monegasque, 311 F.3d at 498-5oi.
209. 404 F.3d 657 (2d Cir. 2005).
210. Id. at 661. In Sarhank, of course, the parent and subsidiary were both incorporated in the
United States. The principle announced by the court, however, would seem to apply equally to foreign
and American entities. The case has been subject to criticism on the basis that the court looked to
Convention Article V(2)(a), related to "subject matter arbitrability," rather than excess of authority
under Convention Article V(i). See Barry H. Garfinkel & David Herlihy, Looking for Law in All the
Wrong Places: The Second Circuit's Decision in Sarhank Group v. Oracle Corporation, 20 INT'L ARB.
REP. i8 (June 2005). Cf. Bridas S.A.I.P.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan, 447 F.3d 411, 420 (5th Cir. 2006)
(government manipulation of oil company made it the state's alter ego).
211. Sarhank, 404 F.3d at 658.
212. Id. at 662 (remanding the case to the district court to find whether, as a matter of fact, the
parent by its actions or inactions had given its subsidiary apparent or actual authority to consent to
arbitration, which such determination to be made under "American contract law or the law of
agency").
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S.A. v. Russian Federation, the Second Circuit had also agreed to
confront an issue of foreign law in deciding whether to confirm a foreign
award against a sovereign state."3 The Russian Federation opposed
confirmation of an award rendered in Sweden on the ground that the
proper party to these proceedings was the "Government of Russia," a
political organ of the Russian state. 14 Overturning a decision of the
Southern District, the court of appeals concluded that the Russian
Federation and the Government of Russia were the same party.215
While not free from doubt, Monegasque may well have been
correctly decided on the narrow facts of the case.16 In essence, it was less
than self-evident that the proper party was before the court.
Determination of this matter raised complex issues of Ukrainian public
and private law that had to be resolved before consideration of award
recognition. The best place to resolve these issues was in the Ukraine.
The decision itself does not operate as a complete bar to award
recognition in the United States. If the foreign courts failed to address
the matter, this would indicate that an alternate forum did not in fact
exist, and the award creditor would be back before the courts in New
York to seek recognition. Moreover, if the Ukrainian courts decided in
favor of piercing the veil, assets could be attached in New York."7
The aspect of Monegasque that has concerned some international
arbitration lawyers is not so much the case itself, but the danger that in
other cases there might be misapplication of its problematic dictum
concerning Article III of the New York Convention. As discussed above,
this opens the door to an unduly broad scope for the Convention
language permitting award non-recognition according to the "rules of
213. 361 F.3d 677,685 (2d Cir. 2004).
214. Id. at 678.
215. Id. at 69o.
216. Cf. New York City Bar Report, supra note 29, at 22-23 (lamenting court's failure to "limit its
dismissal to the enforcement action against Ukraine" rather than confirming dismissal of the
enforcement in its entirety, including the claim against the award debtor); Carolyn B. Lamm & Frank
Spoorenberg, The Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards Under the New York Convention, Recent
Developments, Presentation at the ICC Conference on International Arbitration (Nov. 5, 200)
("[Slhould this U.S. Court of Appeal's decision be echoed in the future court's practice, one could fear
that the objection of forum non conveniens may be extensively addressed by litigants.").
217. Indeed, in Monegasque, the Second Circuit itself acknowledged the unique set of
circumstances militating in favor of dismissal. 311 F.3d 488, 500 (2d Cir. 2002). In particular, the court
pointed out that "the private interest factors might not ordinarily weigh in favor of forum non
conveniens dismissal in a summary proceeding to confirm an arbitration award." Id. In fact, the
Monegasque court distinguished the confirmation proceeding in that case from the "ordinary"
confirmation proceeding, in part because "a trial of the factual issues implicating and establishing"
Ukraine's liability as a non-signer to the agreement was required. Id. The court also noted that the
witnesses who could testify on this point "were beyond the subpoena power of the district court, that
the pertinent documents are in the Ukrainian language and that enforcement or satisfaction of the
arbitral award would not be easier here than in Ukraine." Id.
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procedure" of the territory where the award enforcement is sought. '
Like many cases that are rightly decided on their facts, Monegasque has
announced principles that must be handled with great caution.
V. AWARD REGISTRATION: ENFORCEMENT AS A MULTI-STEP PROCESS
As suggested above, one approach to confirmation of Convention
awards would be to establish a two-step process as an alternative to the
present system. Step one would consist of a decision on recognition
through a motion to confirm the award, analogous to award registration.
The second step would be to use the confirming judgment either to
enforce the award, by giving it effect to attach assets (for an arbitration's
winning claimant) or to provide res judicata effect barring a competing
lawsuit on the merits of the case (for an arbitration's winning
respondent).
This procedure would guarantee due process and fairness to the
party resisting the award and would minimize unnecessary burdens on
the judiciary. For award creditors wishing a "one-stop" enforcement
process, and willing to take their chances with a possible dismissal of
confirmation on due process grounds, the existing system would still be
available.
The winner in the arbitration would bring the motion to confirm
within the time limit prescribed by the Federal Arbitration Act, three
years from the date the award was made. At that time, the party resisting
the motion would receive notice. Thereafter, it would have two
options."9 The first would be to appear for the purpose of presenting any
defenses based on Convention Article V, such as lack of notice or
invalidity of the arbitration agreement. In such an instance, the decision
would be res judicata to bind both the debtor and the creditor.
Several reasons might lead the loser in an arbitration to contest the
award even prior to an enforcement attempt, thus removing the Sword of
Damocles. If the award is procedurally defective due to violations of due
process, this would be easier to demonstrate when recollections of the
218. Id. at 495.
219. An intriguing variation on this theme has been raised by Professor Weintraub, who suggests
the possibility of an ex parte confirmation, which alone would not affect the defendant's rights
sufficiently to require notice and an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 28, at 4.
(Professor Weintraub also explores the possibility of notice to the award debtor as an alternative to ex
parte confirmation. He notes, however, that courts have upheld, as against due process challenges
under the Fourteenth Amendment, the constitutionality of state lis pendens statutes that permit ex
parte notice on land records when the title to real property is subject to litigation that may bind
potential purchasers.) See, e.g., Williams v. Bartlett, 464 U.S. 8oi, 8oi (1983) (dismissing action for
want of substantial federal question, in which the court found that the statute was not constitutionally
infirm under principles of procedural due process); Debral Realty Inc. v. DiChiara, 420 N.E.2d 343,
348 (Mass. 198i) (finding that a simple notice function does not violate Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
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procedural irregularity are still fresh and witnesses remain available to
testify. Just as importantly, a business enterprise that expects to conduct
future operations in the United States will not want its first shipment of
goods burdened with an attachment.
The second option for the party resisting the award would be to do
nothing at that stage. If so, the debtor would receive notice and
opportunity to object during any subsequent attempt to use the
confirmation judgment either by attaching property or by barring further
inconsistent lawsuits on the merits of the dispute.
Under such a process, no unfairness results to the respondent at any
stage. If assets do not exist in the United States, and are unlikely ever to
exist, then the debtor would not likely appear. Such a default scenario at
the confirmation stage would thus involve minimal judicial resources.
The possibility exists, of course, that the debtor will change its mind,
and later begin doing business in the forum or become the owner of
property within the jurisdiction of the enforcement court. If so, there will
be adequate opportunity to present defenses at that moment, when the
panoply of Convention defenses under Article V will continue to exist.
Any burden on judicial resources would be justified at that point by the
prospect of giving effect to the award.
If the award debtor contests the award confirmation and loses, it
might arrange not to own property in the United States. On a cost-
benefit analysis, however, the United States government would still come
out ahead, having met its duty to respect our treaty commitments under
the New York Convention. Since American legal doctrines tend to be
exported, other countries can be expected to follow the example when
the shoe is on the other foot and companies based in the United States
attempt to enforce awards overseas.
It might be objected that the award creditor could still be tempted to
work mischief by choosing a confirmation court in some inaccessible
venue. If the debtor was based in Europe, the action might be brought in
Hawaii. And if the debtor was based in Japan, the action might be
brought in Maine. On the assumption that such additional travel would
place real burdens on modem multinational enterprises, which is not
self-evident to all observers, the argument would run that some award
debtors might be intimidated from stepping up to the plate to take
advantage of the opportunity to oppose the early confirmation.22
To meet this objection, the confirmation stage could be centralized
in one national court, much as the Court of International Trade now
serves that function for litigation related to customs. 22' Indeed,
220. In federal court, venue transfer might be an option under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (20o6).
221. The Court of International Trade was established in i98o. Pub. L. No. 96-417, tit. V, §
501(7), 94 Stat. 1742 (i98o) (codified as 28 U.S.C. ch. 55).
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suggestions have already been discussed within the American Bar
Association (ABA) Customs Law Committee to substitute the CIT
jurisdiction for that of federal district courts in matters related to the
New York Convention. 2'
Unlike this ABA discussion draft, however, the proposal put
forward in this Article would not eliminate the role of federal district
courts. Rather, they would continue to exercise most of their present
functions and responsibilities. What would change is simply that in some
cases the award creditor would be given the opportunity to obtain for the
award the imprimatur of a court in the United States before the three-
year statute of limitations had run.
In the alternative, Congress might by statute create a nationwide
service of process for district courts being asked to grant recognition or
enforcement to foreign awards made in New York Convention countries.
The territorial limits of service have already been extended in other
cases, such as federal interpleader123 and antitrust.224 Similar extensions
would be entirely appropriate as a step toward permitting the United
States to meet its international treaty obligations, particularly ones that
so often benefit American companies when invoked to promote
vindication of contract rights through award enforcement abroad.
CONCLUSION
In the United States, recognition of arbitration awards increasingly
implicates a tension between respect for the international obligations,
embodied in the New York Arbitration Convention, and application of
procedural rules that under domestic law share an equal status with
treaty commitments. The Constitution creates few bright lines to
determine when treaty obligations trump established principles of
222. See Court of International Trade Improvement Act of 2005, § 7 (proposing the addition of 28
U.S.C. § 1585 to provide the CIT with exclusive jurisdiction over any action or proceeding falling
under the 1958 New York Arbitration Convention, and amending FAA § 203 to replace "district
courts of the United States" with "the United States Court of International Trade"). See generally
Lawrence M. Friedman, Draft Interim Report of the ABA Customs Law Committee on the Proposed
Court of International Trade Improvement Act of 2005 (June 28, 2005).
223. FED. R. CIV. P. 4 (k)(i)(C); see also text accompanying notes io6-o9 regarding FED. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(2).
224. FED. R. Crv. P. 4 (k)(s)(D) provides that service will be effective to establish jurisdiction over
the person of a defendant when authorized by federal statute. Section 12 of the Clayton Act provides
worldwide service of process against a corporation ("wherever it may be found") in any action under
the antitrust laws. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (2oo6). Some circuits have held that such service is available only
when the venue requirements have already been met, i.e., the corporation transacts business or is
otherwise "found" in the district where suit is filed. See Daniel v. Am. Bd. of Emergency Med., 428
F.3d 4o8, 402 (2d Cir. 2005). Others circuits read the statute to require only that the corporation have
minimum contacts with the United States as a whole. See In re Auto Refinishing Paint Antitrust Litig.,
358 F.3 d 288, 297 (3d Cir. 2004); Action Embroidery Corp. v. Atl. Embroidery Inc., 368 F.3 d 1147,
ts81 (9 th Cir. 2004).
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domestic law. As a result, motions for confirmation of foreign arbitral
awards often present a choice between competing principles, each of
which would be extended but for the existence of the other.
Several recent court of appeals decisions serve as prisms through
which to separate themes that inhere in the confrontation between these
rival sources of legal authority. While none of the cases yields to facile
analysis, all seem less than optimum in their articulation of guiding
principles.
Lack of personal jurisdiction was invoked to justify refusal of award
recognition in two of these cases, Base Metal and Glencore Grain. Both
decisions misconstrue what is at stake. In neither instance was there a
request that the forum take jurisdiction to determine the substantive
merits of the dispute as an original matter. In both, the parties'
controversy had already been determined by a forum (the arbitral
tribunal) whose jurisdiction had been explicitly accepted by the debtor.
No unfairness exists in holding sophisticated business managers to
their bargain when they engage in international business transactions.
The agreement to arbitrate in a forum which triggers application of the
New York Convention can reasonably be construed as acceptance of the
other party's right to seek award recognition in any of the Convention
members.
Even if no property exists at the time confirmation is sought, the
winner in the arbitration may have legitimate reasons to seek award
recognition. The Federal Arbitration Act gives three years for
confirmation. The award creditor will understandably wish to take
advantage of this window of opportunity in order to stop the three-year
clock from running in the event assets find their way into the United
States some years down the road. The process would be similar to an
award registry, which the award debtor could contest either at time of
registration (when recollections of any alleged procedural defects remain
fresh) or at the moment of an enforcement action.
When the prevailing party is the respondent in the arbitration, the
need for award recognition takes on a different significance.
Notwithstanding the absence of property in the jurisdiction, confirmation
should be available to ensure that the award will be clothed with clear res
judicata effect if the losing claimant seeks to re-litigate the merits of the
dispute within the United States.
Invocation of forum non conveniens as a bar to award enforcement
presents a slightly different challenge. While there may be situations in
which a court is justified in finding its forum inconvenient for recognition
of a New York Convention award, these will be few and far between.
The Second Circuit decision in Monegasque de Reassurances presents
one such exception, given the intricate and nuanced questions raised
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about piercing the corporate veil of a foreign state instrumentality
governed by Ukrainian law.
The need for a pro-recognition policy in arbitration proves
particularly acute to cross-border investments that involve countries
without a longstanding tradition of judicial independence. The type of
international economic cooperation evidenced by those capital flows
rests on a minimum level of investor confidence in fair adjudication.
When the deal goes, the investor will look to present its claim before a
forum more neutral, both politically and procedurally, than the other
side's hometown justice. Nothing in the United States Constitution
prevents promotion of such confidence through recognition of awards
according to the terms of our country's freely accepted treaty obligations.
